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This Article explores the contours of state regulatory power in the
foreign injury context. The Supreme Court has long declined to ques-
tion forum choice in domestic cases, apparently concluding that any
other response would be inconsistent with our federalism. But move
the injury offshore and the judicial deference to state regulatory
supremacy evaporates. Federal judges subject forum choice in trans-
national tort actions to exacting scrutiny, routinely dismissing such
claims on forum non conveniens grounds with no examination of
the state interests at stake. This Article first considers whether the
offshore nature of a foreign injury diminishes or even extinguishes
traditional state regulatory interests in a dispute. In fact, the states
retain substantial deterrence interests in such personal injury
claims. From a state's perspective, it is often irrelevant whether an
out-of-state injury occurs in a sister state or a foreign state. This
Article then demonstrates that neither the Constitution nor cus-
tomary international law supports the federal courts' use of forum
non conveniens in these international diversity actions. The federal
forum non conveniens doctrine should thus be abandoned as
inconsistent with American federalism.
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thank William Page, Berta Hernandez-Turyol, and Lyrissa Lidsky for their thoughtful
comments, suggestions, and encouragement. I am also grateful to Michael Leeman, Simon
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INTRODUCTION
Forum shopping in the United States is a "national legal pas-
time."' It comes in various styles depending on whether the shopper
is the plaintiff or the defendant. We offer horizontal forum shopping,
allowing litigants to choose among the state courts or federal
district courts if diversity jurisdiction exists. We offer vertical
shopping, allowing eligible litigants to choose between state and
federal court. Sometimes we even allow litigants to shop more than
once in a single case. Consider Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,2 involv-
ing a plane crash in Scotland. The Piper plaintiffs engaged in some
aggressive horizontal shopping-though the case could logically
have been brought in Pennsylvania, Ohio, or even Scotland, the
Piper plaintiffs settled on California state court.' Defendants then
countered with a vertical-horizontal shopping stratagem, first
removing the case to federal district court in California and then
obtaining transfer "in the interest of justice" and "[flor the conve-
nience of parties and witnesses" to a federal court in Pennsylvania.4
Shortly thereafter the defendants found that Pennsylvania was not
so convenient after all and successfully moved to dismiss the case on
forum non conveniens grounds.'
The judiciary is openly critical of forum shopping in general and
plaintiff forum shopping in particular.6 Like indulgent parents,
1. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 317, 333 (1967). Note that forum shopping is no idle pastime. Forum choice
matters. Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg found, for example, that
plaintiffs' win rates in federal court decreased from 58 percent to 29 percent when a defendant
successfully transferred the case to another federal district. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-14 (1995)
(examining data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts between fiscal
years 1979-1991 of approximately 2.8 million closed federal civil cases).
2. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
3. Id. at 240. The plaintiff in Piper, who was actually the legal secretary of the lawyer
handling the case, was appointed the administratrix of the decedents' estates by the
California state court prior to filing suit. Id. at 239.
4. Id. at 240 n.4. Transfer was obtained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 240-41.
5. Id. at 241.
6. See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Tex. E. Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1989) (denouncing
forum shopping as "a 'heads I win, tails you lose' ... strategy"); Posadas de P.R. Assocs., Inc.
v. Asociacion de Empleados de Casino de P.R., 873 F.2d 479, 485 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding it
2009]
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however, the federal courts turn a blind eye toward horizontal
forum shopping by plaintiffs in domestic disputes. s This tolerance
encompasses not simply shopping among the various state courts,
but horizontal forum shopping in federal diversity actions as well.'
Vertical shopping, on the other hand, provokes overt hostility
from the federal bench.' Fueled by decades of Erie indoctrination,"°
the federal courts have set about to eliminate incentives and
opportunities for successful vertical shopping by domestic litigants."
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 2 was itself a case about vertical
forum shopping. And the cases following in Erie's wake such as
"wise" to "discourage forum-shopping"); Ojeda Rios v. Wigen, 863 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1988)
(opining that "[florum-shopping is to be discouraged"); Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer
Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1544, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing forum shopping as an
"improper purpose"); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) ("[Ilf the choice of law
were made to turn on events happening after the accident, forum shopping would be
encouraged."); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 686-87 (N.Y. 1985)
(discussing policies disallowing forum shopping); Neumeier v. Keuhner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458
(N.Y. 1972) (refusing to "sanction[] forum shopping [which] allow[s] a party to select a forum
which could give him a larger recovery than the court of his own domicile").
7. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 68 (1991) (asserting that the
courts' jurisprudence has created a "forum shopping system" where plaintiffs can sue a
defendant in any favorable jurisdiction, which has no obligation to defer to a more interested
state's law, so long as there are "minimum contacts" or "general jurisdiction").
8. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). The Ferens case involved
Pennsylvania residents injured in Pennsylvania. Id. at 519. Barred by the Pennsylvania
statute of limitations for tort actions, the plaintiffs filed their claim against John Deere in
federal district court in Mississippi. Id. In a brilliant, though much maligned, display of
tactical competence, the plaintiffs' lawyer used 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer the case to the
Western District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 520. The Supreme Court upheld the transfer. Id. at
532. Justice Scalia dissented, noting that the "fie-and-transfer ploy" will "bring home to the
desired state of litigation all sorts of favorable choice-of-law rules regarding substantive
liability." Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For academic criticism of the decision, see
Kimberly Jade Norwood, Double Forum Shopping and the Extension of Ferens to Federal
Claims That Borrow State Limitations Periods, 44 EMORY L.J. 501,543-46 (1995) (commenting
that Ferens "manipulates the judicial system," "has the appearance of impropriety," and "is
deceitful and foreign to a system of fair play and substantial justice").
9. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
10. As Professor Boner observed over forty-five years ago, the Erie Doctrine "has
continued to gain stature until it is practically a religion. To its critics, the religion may be
wearing a little thin, but heresy is still promptly and mercilessly eradicated." Marian 0.
Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: II, 40 TEx. L. REv. 619, 635 (1962).
11. George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conservative
Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649,661-63,720 (1993) (concluding that the federal
courts have taken an "anti-forum shopping approach ... in [their] reading of Erie's application
to private law federal-state forum shopping").
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Guaranty Trust Co. v. York13 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co. 4 closed down many of the most serious vertical
shopping opportunities. 5
The domestic forum shopping system dovetails nicely with the
Supreme Court's commitment to federalism. 6 If "vigorous state
regulation of private law matters is the goal,"'7 then such federalism
values are well served in the state-to-state realm by letting the
states fight it out, if you will. And because diversity jurisdiction
under the prevailing Erie theory exists to replicate the state court
experience (albeit with federal officials), the federalism critique
explains the Court's permissive attitude toward horizontal forum
shopping in federal diversity cases, as well as its hostility to vertical
forum shopping in the diversity context.' 8
The Court's reaction to international forum shopping, however,
defies the federalism paradigm. It seems that the Court is a fair
weather federalist, abandoning its deference to the states at the
drop of a foreign hat. As the federal forum non conveniens cases
demonstrate, the federal courts subject horizontal shopping by di-
versity plaintiffs in transnational actions to intense oversight. 9 On
the other hand, they tolerate, perhaps even encourage, substantial
and predictable vertical forum shopping by defendants who clearly
prefer the federal to the state courts in foreign injury disputes.2"
13. 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act to require the use of forum
statutes of limitations in diversity actions).
14. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act to require the use of forum
conflicts of law rules in diversity actions).
15. This is not to say that no vertical forum shopping incentives exist. In Worldwide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), for example, defense counsel's belief that
the corporate defendants would fare better with a federal court jury than with a state jury
pool motivated defendants to take their challenge to Oklahoma's exercise ofjurisdiction to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 291; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)
(allowing a federal court sitting in diversity to consider a forum selection clause as part of
transfer decision in spite of the fact that the state disfavored such clauses).
16. See Brown, supra note 11, at 708 (asserting that the "result of these [domestic forum
shopping] cases is to leave matters in the hands of the states, and the Court's language makes
it clear that is its intent").
17. Id. at 651.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2003)
(affirming defendant's removal from state court to federal court and subsequent dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds); Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602,605 (10th Cir.
2009]
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This Article explores the relevance of American federalism to the
federal supervision of transnational forum shopping.21 The discus-
sion focuses on the most controversial category of international
cases: claims by foreign plaintiffs against American corporate
defendants arising from personal injuries sustained abroad. These
disputes, which typically involve global goods,22 fall into two
categories: classic, encompassing products like Ford Explorers or
Mattel toys, and pharmaceutical.
Part I of this Article describes the American forum shopping
scene and the federalism values that animate the Supreme Court's
approach to forum choice in disputes arising from domestic injuries.
Part II details the federal courts' sharply different response to
forum shopping by foreign injury litigants. In contrast to the pro-
plaintiff forum shopping system available in domestic cases, the
federal forum non conveniens decisions reveal a distinctly pro-
defendant, anti-forum shopping bent.23 From a federalism perspec-
tive, the divergent approach suggests that the federal courts either
perceive no federalism interest in foreign injury claims or detect a
superior federal interest at work.24
1998) (affirming dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens of a case removed from
state court to federal court in Ohio and subsequently transferred to federal court in Kansas);
Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds after removal from Florida state court).
21. Note that this is not an "Erie" article. The discussion here focuses on the initial federal
decision to supervise international forum shopping rather than the differences between state
and federal forum non conveniens practice. For an excellent discussion of the Erie problem
in the forum non conveniens context, see generally Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100
YALE L.J. 1935 (1991) (finding that the Rules of Decision Act requires the federal courts to use
state forum non conveniens rules when use of the federal rule "unduly interfere[s] with the
regulatory prerogatives of the states"); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal
Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA
L. REv. 1147, 1195-1205 (2006) (discussing Rules of Decision Act problem) [hereinafter Lear,
Inherent Power]; Laurel E. Miller, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of
Foreign Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369,
1387-89, 1392 (1991) (arguing that "federal diversity courts should, under Erie, apply state
forum non conveniens rules").
22. I define global goods as products "produced for worldwide consumption without
material country-specific modifications in design." Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests,
Foreign Injuries, and Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 573 (2007)
[hereinafter Lear, National Interests].
23. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
24. See Brown, supra note 11, at 709-10.
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Part III explores these hypotheses in the context of state jurisdic-
tion to prescribe. Variously described as "legislative," "prescriptive,"
or "regulatory" jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe refers to the
power of a sovereign to apply its substantive law to a particular
event. An American state's desire to apply its own substantive law
to a foreign injury dispute should represent the clearest indication
of regulatory interest in a case.25 Yet only the Tenth Circuit immu-
nizes actions to which a domestic state's law applies from forum non
conveniens scrutiny.2" In fact, the Supreme Court in Piper upheld a
forum non conveniens dismissal in the face of the lower court's
finding that Pennsylvania and Ohio law governed the dispute.2" The
Piper Court wholly ignored the states' interests in the case, repeat-
edly referring to the national interest at stake.2 s
Part III first considers whether the international character of
overseas accidents extinguishes a state's traditional regulatory
interest in these personal injury actions. This section concludes that
a state's interest in a foreign injury dispute does not differ meaning-
fully from its interest in a domestic claim arising from an out-of-
state injury. With respect to global goods, the states have substan-
tial deterrence interests in out-of-state accidents, especially when
a product is widely used by domestic consumers.
Part III then examines whether the Constitution or customary
international law limits the states' traditional regulatory power in
the foreign injury realm or divests states of such power entirely.
This discussion finds that customary international law, the federal
foreign affairs powers, and the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Clauses impose no material restrictions on state jurisdiction
to prescribe in transnational torts cases.
This Article concludes that federal court oversight of interna-
tional forum shopping is inconsistent with the central goals of
American federalism. The federal judiciary has failed to recognize
that the global nature of the twenty-first century economy magnifies
rather than diminishes the states' interests in extraterritorial
25. See Stein, supra note 21, at 1971.
26. See Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that when domestic law applies, forum non conveniens is inapplicable).
27. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 245 n.10 (1981).
28. Id. at 260-61.
2009]
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injuries. From the states' perspective, it is often irrelevant whether
an out-of-state injury occurs in a sister state or a foreign state.
States retain significant regulatory interests in foreign injury
litigation. And although the Constitution and customary interna-
tional law divest the states of prescriptive authority over a small
subset of such claims, that fact alone hardly authorizes the federal
judiciary to curtail state regulatory efforts in the foreign injury
realm.
I. THE DOMESTIC FORUM SHOPPING SCENE
The Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and
interstate preclusion decisions provide plaintiffs with extensive
state-to-state forum shopping opportunities. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,29 later decisions such as Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,3 ° and especially the advent of general jurisdiction,"1
empower plaintiffs to sue corporate defendants in many different
states. Similarly, Supreme Court case law in the choice-of-law realm
explicitly recognizes that more than one sovereign may consti-
tutionally apply its own law to a multistate dispute." The "modest
restrictions" found in the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit
Clauses require only that a state seeking to apply forum law "have
a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts [with the
dispute], creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."3 States are free to
apply local procedural rules, including forum statutes of limitations,
without regard to the forum's relationship to the dispute. 4 And
domestic interstate preclusion rules ensure that regardless of how
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing the "minimum contacts" test for personal
jurisdiction).
30. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
31. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
32. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
33. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
34. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1988). It appears that there are
some limits on a state's ability to categorize rules as "procedural." In Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick, the Court declined to accept the Texas Supreme Court's attempt to categorize a contract
provision as a foreign statute of limitations. 281 U.S. 397, 391 (1930). In that Dick came down
during the heyday of Lochner and before Erie, one wonders whether such an attempt might
succeed today.
[Vol. 51:087
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extreme the forum choice or outrageous the choice-of-law decision,
plaintiffs may enforce sister state judgments with ease.35 Thus, a
plaintiff suing an interstate entity need not concern itself with the
location of assets so long as such assets are domestically held.
The seemingly pro-plaintiff, state-to-state shopping system for
domestic disputes is equally available to federal diversity plaintiffs.
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporates the
personal jurisdiction practices of the state in which a diversity
action is filed;3" federal diversity litigants thus experience personal
jurisdiction constraints identical to those found in the forum state's
courts.37 On the choice-of-law front, Klaxon v. Stentor" requires
federal courts sitting in diversity to use forum conflict of laws rules,
thus preserving plaintiffs state choice-of-law bargains, while Van
Dusen v. Barrack39 prevents defendants from obtaining substantive
choice-of-law advantages through transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.40
Attempts by domestic litigants to shop vertically in the post-Erie
environment, on the other hand, have met with overt hostility from
35. Absent a personal or subject matter jurisdiction error on the part of the rendering
court, a sister state must recognize the judgment. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,
238 (1908). Enforcement is a slightly different matter. The state recognizing the judgment
need only enforce the judgment to the same extent that it enforces domestic judgments. See,
e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); Bibace v. Schmickler, No.
CV990173767, 2001 WL 438857, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2001); Tareco Props., Inc.
v. Morriss, No. M2002-02950-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2636705, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18,
2004); see also 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 782 (2008).
36. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
37. Although plaintiffs filing in federal court as an original matter must comply with
federal venue requirements, the federal venue scheme provides few real restrictions on
plaintiffs forum choice, particularly with respect to claims against multinational corporations
over whom general jurisdiction is readily available. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2006) (defining
corporate residence for purposes of § 1391(a) and (b) in terms of personal jurisdiction).
38. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
39. 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (holding that the conflicts rules of the transferor district follow
the case, thus eliminating potential choice-of-law gains by the defendant through transfer).
Shopping for procedural advantages is also protected in the federal system, as vividly
illustrated in Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990) (holding that the transferring
forum's statute of limitations follows the case).
40. Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). Section 1404 authorizes transfer only
to a district in which the action could originally have been filed by the plaintiff. See Hoffman
v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960). In the context of a large multinational corporate defendant
haled into court under a general jurisdiction approach, the limits in § 1404 are very minimal
indeed.
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the federal judiciary. Erie v. Tompkins was itself a case about forum
shopping, at least to some degree. Although Erie and subsequent
cases such as Guaranty Trust Co. v. York4' and Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp.42 may not have been entirely successful in eliminating
the differences between state and federal courts in diversity cases,
it was not for lack of trying. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc." is the latest installment in the Erie saga, focusing on the
difference in review standards for new trial claims based upon
excessiveness." While Gasperini confirms that room exists for
technical differences between federal and state court procedures, it
reaffirms that uniformity of outcome remains the driving force
behind the Court's Erie jurisprudence.45
At first glance, the Court's apparent support for a decidedly pro-
plaintiff system" of forum shopping in domestic private law
41. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
42. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
43. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
44. Id. at 418-19.
45. The Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment prevented the Gasperini Court
from implementing the New York statutory scheme as it was written. Id. at 432-33. In an
effort to achieve uniformity, however, Justice Ginsburg crafted a version of the New York
system for use in the federal district courts in New York. Id. at 438-39.
Writing prior to Gasperini, Allan Stein acknowledged that the search for equality may be
the "driving force" behind the current Erie doctrine. Stein, supra note 21, at 1941. He
advocated a type of vertical interest analysis that focused on whether the goals supporting the
state's law are undermined by federal nonconformity. Id. If not, he concluded that the Rules
of Decision Act did not mandate the use of state law in federal court. Id. at 1956.
The Supreme Court has largely confined its Erie oversight to attempts by plaintiffs to gain
litigation advantages by filing in federal rather than state court. Only Van Dusen, which
applied Kaxon to the transfer scenario, directly addressed a defendant's attempts to obtain
choice-of-law advantages in the federal system that could not be obtained in state court. Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628 (1964). Van Dusen is somewhat ambiguous about the
offensiveness of defense shopping under the Erie regime because the decision concentrated
more on congressional intent regarding § 1404 rather than the Rules of Decision Act.
Lower federal court cases arising in the removal context indicate, however, that defense
efforts to obtain choice-of-law advantages through vertical forum shopping are equally at odds
with Erie's central goal of uniformity. See, e.g., Frenette v. Vickery, 522 F. Supp. 1098, 1100
(D. Conn. 1981) (applying Connecticut law on unreasonable settlement offers to avoid
frustrating the aims of Erie). The international forum selection clause cases following Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), however, indicate that choice-of-law
gains may still be had through removal. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858
F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal law governed the enforceability of an
international forum selection clause even though § 1404 was inapplicable). These Erie
loopholes seem to be centered on international choice of forum issues.
46. See Weinberg, supra note 7, at 68-69 (attributing this bias for the plaintiff to the
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 96 2009-2010
FEDERALISM, FORUM SHOPPING
disputes appears surprising--especially given the generally "con-
servative" bent of the Rehnquist-Roberts Courts.47 But as Professor
George Brown has demonstrated, the Court's commitment to fed-
eralism explains this seeming inconsistency. Defining federalism as
"the importance of ensuring the states' primary role over a broad
sphere of domestic governance," Brown explains that "in any clash
between a defendant-oriented anti-forum-shopping principle on the
one hand and the rights and prerogatives of the forum state on the
other, the Court comes down firmly on the side of the state."4
The horizontal forum shopping cases fall neatly into Brown's
federalism critique. The Court recognizes a "dominant federalism
interest" in choice-of-law cases; the state in such disputes "wishes
to regulate through adjudication of the dispute and application of its
law."49 State-to-state forum shopping, therefore, "encourages the
states to govern"-the very goal federalism is expected to further.5 °
The federalism critique also explains the Court's hostility to
plaintiff and defense shopping in the state-to-federal realm. Erie,
for example, is generally taken as a strong condemnation of forum
shopping, yet, as Brown demonstrates, Erie's seemingly pro-
defendant rationale "advances [the Court's] federalism goal: state
governance in the face of federal authority."51 State-to-federal (or
vertical) shopping impairs state governance; state-to-state (or
horizontal) shopping, on the other hand, highlights "the differences
[that] state governance fosters."52 "[W]hen federalism is out of the
demands of a national market and a federalist mentality); see also Brown, supra note 11, at
672-76.
47. See Brown, supra note 11, at 675-79 (discussing factors indicating that the Court's
approach may be legitimately termed "conservative"). According to Brown, a conservative
court is defined by values such as avoiding the "proliferation of lawsuits," distrust of
manipulating the system to achieve pro-plaintiff results, and a general pro-defendant
inclination. Id. at 651. With reference to constitutional values, a conservative court is defined
by themes such as a restrained judiciary, loyalty to original intent in constitutional
construction, a strong emphasis on federalism and the separation of powers, and deference
to majoritarian decision making. Id. at 677-78.
48. Id. at 708.
49. Id. at 710.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 708.
52. Id. at 710.
2009]
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equation," however, Brown observes "a strong tendency toward a
pro-defendant stance." 3
II. FORUM SHOPPING BY FOREIGN INJURY LITIGANTS
When the accident moves offshore, the federal courts' response to
forum shopping transforms dramatically. The federal courts subject
horizontal forum shopping by diversity plaintiffs to exacting
scrutiny while encouraging significant vertical shopping by defen-
dants seeking choice-of-law advantages through removal to a federal
forum. Though the strongest anti-forum shopping rhetoric is re-
served for foreign plaintiffs,54 American residents find their choice
of a domestic forum subject to intense scrutiny.55 The experience of
53. Id. at 709. Brown uses the summary judgment and implied rights of action cases to
support this observation. Id. at 688-89. He uses the forum selection clause cases like Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), and Ricoh to illustrate situations in which the
Court may see no federalism interest. Id. at 688-90.
54. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)
(affirming dismissal of complaint against an American corporation brought by American and
Argentinean plaintiffs in favor of Argentinean forum); Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d
8, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of American plaintiffs'
complaint against an American elevator servicing company because Colombia was an
alternate forum and public and private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal);
Kryvicky v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 807 F.2d 514, 516, 518 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming
forum non conveniens dismissal of American resident's claim arising from plane crash in
Spain allegedly caused by defects in a Boeing plane); Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406,
1412 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of claims by American
residents against an American corporation because Taiwan was an adequate alternate forum
and private and public interest factors favored dismissal); Vlasic v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 451
F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (dismissing American resident plaintiff's claim on
forum non conveniens grounds because Aruba had greater interest in the case, was an
available forum, and had most of the evidence); Colantonio v. Hilton Int'l Co., No. CIV.A. 03-
1833, 2004 WL 1810291, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2004) (dismissing American plaintiff's
claim on forum non conveniens grounds because Italian co-defendant could not be joined, Italy
had a greater interest in the case, and evidence was located in Italy); Reers v. Deutsche Bahn
AG, 320 F. Supp. 2d 140, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing American plaintiffs' claims
against a French rail company arising from accident in France); Morse v. Sun Int'l Hotels,
Ltd., No. 98-7451-Civ, 2001 WL 34874967, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (dismissing American
plaintiffs claim against an American corporation arising from an offshore accident because
certain parties could not be joined); Potomac Capital Inv. Corp. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaapt
Maatschapplj N.V., No. 97 Civ. 8141, 1998 WL 92416, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting Dutch
defendant's forum non conveniens motion against American plaintiff); Kristoffv. Otis Elevator
Co., No. CIV.A.96-4123, 1997 WL 67797, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (dismissing American plaintiff's
complaint on forum non conveniens grounds because the Bahamas had greater interest in
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the resident plaintiff injured abroad will thus differ dramatically
from that of her neighbor injured within the United States.
The key tool with which the federal courts regulate forum
shopping by foreign injury plaintiffs is the forum non conveniens
dismissal 56-a discretionary power that allows the judiciary to
independently evaluate a plaintiffs choice of forum. A federal forum
non conveniens inquiry proceeds in two steps. First, the district
court must determine that an "adequate alternative forum" exists
for trial.57 Second, the court evaluates and balances the private and
public interests at stake in the particular dispute.5"
When the Supreme Court originally embraced forum non con-
veniens for civil claims in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,59 it was in the
context of domestic forum shopping.6 ° The inquiry focused on
defendant's hardship, emphasizing that "the plaintiffs choice of
adjudicating the case, and more evidence was there); McCarthy v. Canadian Nat'l Rys., 322
F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Mass. 1971) (dismissing a case filed by an American resident against
a Canadian corporation because the plaintiff was a Canadian resident when the accident
occurred, the accident occurred in Canada, and Canada had a greater interest in the case).
56. The federal courts have also used international forum selection clauses as a means of
regulating international forum shopping in the contract realm. I exempted contract cases from
this analysis for two reasons: first, many states have adopted UCC provisions and the Second
Restatement of Conflicts, both of which explicitly recognize forum selection clauses as binding,
and second, the new Hague convention on international forum selection recognizes such
clauses as binding.
57. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947) ("In all cases in which the
doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which
the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between
them."). The alternative forum must be both adequate and available. The foreign forum will
be deemed inadequate only if "the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." Piper, 454 U.S. at 254. A defendant
may waive many defenses including lack of personal jurisdiction, venue, and the statute of
limitations, in order to make the alternative forum available. See Johnston v. Multidata Sys.
Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2008); Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A.,
997 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1993).
58. In a federal forum non conveniens analysis, the relevant private interests include the
litigant's access to proof, ability to compel the attendance of witnesses, the cost of such
attendance, the possibility of viewing any premises (if appropriate to the action), the
enforceability of the judgment, the "relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial," as well
as any "practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gulf
Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. The public interest inquiry encompasses factors such as docket
congestion, the burden of jury service in a community having "no relation to the litigation,"
the desirability in diversity actions of having the trial in the forum whose law will apply, and
the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." Id. at 508-09.
59. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
60. Id. at 511-12.
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forum should rarely be disturbed." 1 In 1948, only one year after
Gulf Oil was decided, Congress rendered federal forum non con-
veniens irrelevant to domestic claims by authorizing interdistrict
transfers within the federal system under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.62
Some thirty years later, however, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 3
reconfigured the Gulf Oil formula for foreign injury claims and
reinvigorated federal forum non conveniens practice. Piper focused
on the plaintiffs motives for choosing the American forum. The
Court explained:
When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to
assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is
foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable.
Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens
inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign
plaintiffs choice deserves less deference.'
Despite the Court's apparent interest in convenience, neither the
plaintiffs convenience nor the defendant's hardship drives post-
Piper outcomes in the federal courts. Modern forum non conveniens
jurisprudence employs a "most suitable forum" standard 5 under
which the federal courts actively second guess forum choice in
international disputes.
Several aspects of the federal regime deserve comment. First, the
intense hostility found in the vertical shopping cases virtually
evaporates when the case takes on transnational attributes. The
federal courts tolerate significant and predictable vertical forum
shopping by foreign injury defendants. Second, the federal system
richly rewards defendants for their vertical shopping behavior. The
Supreme Court has never formally considered the Erie question
61. Id. at 508.
62. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (stating that forum non
conveniens dismissals should only be applied when the "alternate forum is abroad"); Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (explaining that Congress was revising as well as
codifying the forum non conveniens doctrine when it created § 1404).
63. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
64. Id. at 256.
65. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather
Fantastic Fiction," 103 L.Q. REv. 398, 404-05 (1987).
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with respect to forum non conveniens," but the courts of appeals
have unanimously rejected such challenges.6" Not only are the vast
majority of forum non conveniens motions granted by the federal
courts,6" the federal standard is often more aggressive, or more
aggressively applied, than the standards in the state courts.6 9
Lastly, the availability of transfer provides its own incentive for
vertical shopping in transnational claims. Forum non conveniens
standards vary significantly across the circuits.7" Corporate defen-
dants routinely remove international disputes to federal court, then
follow with a motion to transfer to another district that boasts more
favorable forum non conveniens conditions.71
The federal courts' use of federal, as opposed to state, forum non
conveniens standards in diversity actions has had a profound impact
on the states' response to foreign injury litigation. Before Piper,
states employed a variety of forum non conveniens formulae, many
of which were significantly less draconian than those used in federal
court.7 After Piper, such states became "magnets" for international
cases.7 3 In many of the state supreme court decisions adopting the
66. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 248 n.13 (reserving the Erie question).
67. See, e.g., Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2000); Rivendell
Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th Cir. 1993); Royal Bed &
Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990);
In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d
1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316 (6th Cir. 1974).
68. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 568 nn.49 & 58 (2007).
69. See Miller, supra note 21, at 1369, 1373-76 (discussing the federal standard and state
variances from that standard). Most of the states have now embraced the Piper standard, but
several state standards, including those of Connecticut and Delaware, vary significantly from
the federal formula.
70. Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL.
L. REv. 309, 312 (2002); Lear, Inherent Power, supra note 21, at 1148.
71. See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 240-41 (dismissing case on the grounds of forum non
conveniens after the case was removed to federal court and then transferred, both at the
request of the defendants); Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir.
1998) (affirming dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens of a case removed from
state court to federal court in Ohio and subsequently transferred to federal court in Kansas).
72. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Swain, 362 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1978) (holding
that a case could be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens in Florida only if none of
the parties are Florida residents); Burrington v. Ashland Oil Co., 356 A.2d 506, 510 (Vt. 1976)
(holding that forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate only when the plaintiff will not
be inconvenienced and it is apparent that the plaintiff is just attempting to "vex, harass, or
oppress the defendant).
73. See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational
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harsher Piper standard, the courts discussed the state/federal
differences in forum non conveniens standards and cited the
resulting increase in state court case loads as the primary reason for
using the federal approach.74
More interesting still is the federal courts' response to horizontal
forum shopping in international cases. Gone is the good natured
tolerance of forum choice found in domestic injury disputes. The
federal judiciary subjects horizontal forum shopping by foreign
injury plaintiffs to meticulous regulation. Under the private inter-
est portion of the forum non conveniens inquiry, district courts
thoroughly review the location of the evidence and the availability
of witnesses. 75 Note that the defendant need not provide a list of
specific information or witnesses overseas; it is enough that the
defense allege that "crucial witnesses and evidence [are] beyond the
reach of compulsory process. 76 Moreover, the ability of the defen-
dant to implead potential third parties is one of the key factors
supporting dismissal.7 7 The district courts do not require the
defendant to demonstrate any realistic expectation of recompense
from such third parties, nor must the defendant prove that a post-
judgment action for compensation or indemnification action will be
prejudicial.
Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEx. L. REv. 937,
951-52 (1990).
74. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 21-23 (Cal. 1991); Kinney Sys., Inc. v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1996).
75. See, e.g., Snaza v. Howard Johnson Franchise Sys., No. 3:07-CV-0495-0, 2008 WL
5383155, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24,2008) (dedicating two pages to discussion of availability
of evidence and witnesses); Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 06 Civ. 7839 (PXL), 2008 WL
4849334, at *9-12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2008) (devoting four pages to discussion of evidence and
witnesses as a private interest factor); LaSala v. Bank of Cyprus Pub. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d
246, 259-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (devoting three pages to the discussion of witnesses and evidence
as a private interest factor).
76. Piper, 454 U.S. at 243; see also Perez-Lang v. Corporacion De Hoteles, S.A., 575 F.
Supp. 2d 1345, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the ability to compel witnesses to testify was
the most crucial private interest factor and that depositions did not satisfy the need for live
testimony).
77. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 259; Perez-Lang, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1352 (finding that the
inability to implead the Dominican automobile driver was a critical factor); Webster v. Santa
Fe Int'l Corp., No. 3:98-CV-1314-D, 1999 WL 20840, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 1999) (finding
the inability to implead a third party to clearly support dismissal in order to settle everything
in one trial).
78. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 259.
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Even when the private interest factors are in equipoise, the public
interest inquiry usually tips the balance in favor of dismissal.79 The
federal courts employ a situs presumption, which assumes that the
accident forum has the greatest interest in the dispute."0 In claims
involving global goods, several of the public interest factors should
favor trial in an American court. The Gulf Oil opinion expressed
concern about the "burden" of jury service on a community having
"no relation to the litigation," for example.81 In a global goods case,
however, a local jury has a significant interest in determining the
dangerousness of a product widely used by local citizens. Gulf Oil
similarly highlighted the desirability of having diversity cases tried
in the forum whose law will apply.82 In global goods disputes, the
product is usually designed and/or manufactured in the United
States. In a case like Piper, in which a court finds that domestic law
applies to the design or manufacturing defect claims, this factor
should weigh strongly against dismissal. But under the public
interest framework employed by Piper, the dispositive factor in the
analysis is the "local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home."8 3 What localizes the controversy for the federal
courts is the location of the accident.'
Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp. 5 vividly illustrates the
intensity of federal forum choice scrutiny and the strength of the
federal courts' situs presumption. In Iragorri, a Florida resident was
79. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 568.
80. See Lear, Inherent Power, supra note 21, at 1176.
81. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
82. Id.
83. Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. I have explained elsewhere that Piper embraced a
presumption that the U.S. interest in a foreign accident is minimal. See Lear, National
Interests, supra note 22, at 590-94 (2007). The federal courts take that presumption one step
further and assume that the accident forum has the greatest interest in the dispute. The
district courts consistently measure the convenience of litigation against adjudication in the
accident forum, and it is the sovereign interests of the accident state that the courts routinely
find to be implicated. See, e.g., Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2003);
Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 610 (10th Cir. 1998).
84. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 260-61 (1981). Some federal courts have treated manufacturing
activity as localizing the controversy. See Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 766,
782-83 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing federal courts that have treated manufacturing activity
as localizing the controversy, but ultimately rejecting it as contrary to Piper). However, Piper
implicitly rejected this approach. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 260-61 (1981).
85. 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001).
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killed in an elevator accident in Colombia.86 The elevator had been
designed by United Technologies (Otis) in the United States and
manufactured in Brazil by the defendant's wholly-owned subsidiary,
Otis of Brazil.17 The Iragorri family, all of whom were Florida resi-
dents, brought suit in federal district court in Connecticut against
Otis, whose principal place of business was in Connecticut, and an
American maintenance corporation that was similarly subject to
personal jurisdiction there." The complaint alleged that design
defects and maintenance policy failures occurred at the American
offices of both companies.8 9
The district judge first severed the action, sending the suit
against the maintenance corporation to the district of Maine.90 Both
defendants made forum non conveniens motions, and both district
courts dismissed the actions, concluding that in spite of the design
evidence in the United States, the guerilla violence in Colombia, the
extended backlog in the Colombian courts, and the fact that the
compensation available under the Colombian system was wholly
inadequate by Florida standards, Colombia was a more convenient
forum."s The First Circuit upheld the dismissal.92 After a rehearing
en banc, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case against
Otis for trial.93 The Iragorris spent seven years defending their
choice of forum before an American court addressed the merits of
their claims.94
The situs presumption is interesting on several levels. First, the
notion that the accident state has the greatest interest in a global
goods dispute is usually dead wrong. Brainerd Currie observed fifty
years ago that the traditional place of injury rule undermines the
interests of the affected states more often than it furthers them.95
86. Id. at 70.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 75.
90. Id. at 70.
91. Id.
92. Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
93. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d at 76.
94. Id. at 69-70, 76.
95. See Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict ofLaws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 161 (1963). This essay, which
was the companion piece to Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
applied Currie's governmental interest analysis to a tort scenario using the facts of Grant v.
104 [Vol. 51:087
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This insight is equally applicable to the foreign injury dispute. As
I have demonstrated elsewhere, the American deterrence interest
in foreign injuries caused by global goods routinely equals or
exceeds those of the injury forum.' Litigation of such claims in the
American courts is critical to the safety of American consumers.97
The impact of the situs presumption on individual state's interests,
though smaller in scale, is essentially the same. Moreover, the situs
presumption obfuscates the potential state interests involved in
such cases. Because the courts assume that the foreign forum's
interest is paramount, federal forum non conveniens decisions
seldom contain formal choice-of-law findings or any meaningful
discussion of state interests.98
Lastly, it should be noted that the situs presumption is inconsis-
tent with the central premises of the Supreme Court's domestic
forum shopping system. Both the personal jurisdiction and choice-of-
law decisions explicitly concede that more than one sovereign may
have an interest in adjudicating or applying its law to an interstate
dispute. Justice Brennan, for example, explained in Burger King
that Michigan's "acknowledged interest" in the case did not render
"jurisdiction in Florida unconstitutional."9 In the choice-of-law
realm, the Court abandoned its efforts under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to identify the state with the greatest interest in an
interstate dispute. °° A state need only have "a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts" with the dispute to apply its
law despite the fact that another state has a greater interest in
regulating the dispute.' 01 Yet when the injury occurs overseas, the
federal courts vest the accident forum with the presumptive right to
McAufliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
96. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 590-99.
97. Id. at 573-78.
98. Only the Tenth Circuit appears to require a formal choice-of-law analysis as part of
the forum non conveniens dismissal in diversity cases. See Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that when domestic law applies or when
foreign forum is inadequate, forum non conveniens is inapplicable).
99. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483 (1995).
100. See Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-01, 505
(1939) (acknowledging that both California and Massachusetts had the right to regulate the
event through application of their law and upholding the California court's decision to apply
forum law).
101. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
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apply its substantive and procedural laws as well as its conflict of
laws rules.
In sum, the federal courts' response to forum shopping transforms
when the accident occurs overseas. Gone is the relaxed attitude
toward plaintiffs engaged in horizontal forum shopping. Similarly
absent is the hostility toward litigants who seek choice-of-law ad-
vantages through vertical shopping. As currently styled, the federal
international forum choice regime overtly favors defendants while
subjecting the plaintiffs choice of forum to intense oversight, even
when that plaintiff is an American citizen.102
III. THE RELEVANCE OF FEDERALISM TO INTERNATIONAL FORUM
CHOICE OVERSIGHT
As noted above, the federal courts' anti-forum shopping, pro-
defendant stance in international disputes differs markedly from its
pro-plaintiff attitude toward domestic shopping. Professor Brown's
federalism critique suggests two potential explanations: (1) the
federal courts perceive no federalism interests in these cases, and/or
(2) they believe that a stronger national interest trumps those
interests. 103
102. Although this Article does not consider the plight of the American resident injured
abroad, I have always found shocking the number of cases in which American residents
injured overseas are relegated to foreign forums. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22,
at 570 n.58. Technically, an American plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to significant
deference because she is suing at "home." See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-
56 (1981). Note that those American residents who succeed in their efforts to acquire an
American forum in which to litigate their cases usually do so only after a long and expensive
fight that often involves a trip to the court of appeals. See, e.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere,
S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2002); Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
2001) (en banc); see also Guidi v. Inter-Cont Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reversing district court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of complaint brought
by an American plaintiff against an American hotel chain for injury sustained in Egypt);
Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 430 (lst Cir. 1991) (finding district court erred
in dismissing complaint brought by American citizens against a hotel owner because Turkey
was not an adequate alternate forum); Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir.
1991) (reversing district court's dismissal of case on forum non conveniens grounds because
American plaintiffs choice of forum deserved greater deference); Lehman v. Humphrey
Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 347 (8th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds of a case brought by an American plaintiff against a foreign
corporation because district court failed to properly weigh plaintiffs ability to litigate her
claims in foreign court and give proper weight to her residence).
103. Brown, supra note 11, at 709-10.
106
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Both explanations are plausible. Certainly an unstated assump-
tion in the major federal forum non conveniens decisions is that
foreign injury claims lie outside the normal sphere of state regula-
tory authority. Whether this is because state interest ends at our
national borders or because federal power is supreme over all things
international is unclear. In Piper, the Third Circuit concluded that
Ohio and Pennsylvania law would apply to the dispute, 10 4 yet the
Supreme Court discussed only the deterrence to be gained from trial
in an American court0 5 and concluded that "[t]he American interest
in [the] accident" was insufficient to justify the commitment of
judicial time and resources necessary to try the case in the United
States.' O6 Many of the courts of appeals decisions rejecting Erie
challenges to the federal doctrine similarly treat state interests as
irrelevant. In Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., °7 for example, the
Eleventh Circuit specifically relied on the national interests at
stake.' And although lower court cases occasionally include an
unfocused search for the forum state's physical contacts as part of
the public interest analysis,10 9 none of these opinions considers the
weight these contacts deserve or their relevance to the public
interest inquiry.
A state's desire to apply its own law ought to represent the
strongest indication of state interest in a particular dispute."0 When
a state enacts extraterritorial legislation, it is fair to assume that
the state legislature has evaluated potential litigation logistics and
that the state's elected lawmakers have concluded that the citizens
of the state have sufficient interest and sufficient stake in the
dispute to warrant its adjudication."' The state in such cases has
already performed the balancing required by the federal forum non
conveniens inquiry. From a federalism perspective then, a federal
104. Piper, 454 U.S. at 245 n.10.
105. Id. at 260-61.
106. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
107. 289 F.3d 1300 (1lth Cir. 2002).
108. Id. at 1311-14.
109. See, e.g., Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781-85 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
110. As Allan Stein points out, "[t]he most obvious reason a state might want to retain a
case ... is that it perceives some regulatory stake in the underlying dispute." Stein, supra note
21, at 1971.
111. Cf. Lear, Inherent Power, supra note 21, at 1177-79 (discussing the tension between
forum non conveniens and congressional jurisdiction to prescribe).
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forum non conveniens dismissal is antithetical to state regulatory
supremacy in the private law arena.
The following sections test the relevance of federalism to interna-
tional forum choice by examining the limits on state jurisdiction to
prescribe. Part A considers whether the international character of
foreign injury disputes divests the states of their traditional reg-
ulatory role in the torts arena. Part B then analyzes external limits
on state jurisdiction to prescribe potentially supplied by customary
international law and the Constitution.
A. Substantive State Interests in Foreign Injuries
Personal injury torts are traditionally thought to implicate two
types of state interests: compensation and deterrence. In the
paradigm case of in-state injury and state resident plaintiff, both
these interests are at their zenith. When the plaintiff is an outsider,
whether a resident of a sister state or a foreign country, the state's
compensation interest disappears. Move the accident out of state,
and most judges assume that the state's deterrence interest is
similarly extinguished." 2 This is where the analysis goes wrong,
particularly in the global goods arena.
I have argued elsewhere that the federal courts routinely mis-
apprehend the strength of the national adjudicatory interests in
112. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260-61 (1981) (suggesting
incremental deterrence value of a case is not enough to warrant trial in the United States);
Faat v. Honeywell Intl Inc., No. Civ.A.04-4333, 2005 WL 2475701, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2005)
(contending that local interest was minimal because the majority of conduct occurred in Spain
and the incremental deterrence that would be gained was insignificant); Miller v. Boston Sci.
Corp., 380 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting that "citizens of New Jersey undoubtedly
have an interest in ensuring that American manufacturers do not produce defective products,"
however, incremental deterrence to be gained was not compelling); Zermeno v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646, 663 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (dismissing case filed by Mexican
plaintiffs against American airplane manufacturer because, among other reasons, the
incremental deterrence to be gained from trying case in United States was negligible); Simcox
v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 689, 699 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that "[t]he incremental
deterrence that might be gained if defendants were held liable in Texas ... is likely to be
inconsequential[, and] [t]he American interest in this controversy is negligible and is
insufficient to justify the commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be
required if the case were to be tried here"). But see Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796,
809 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (dismissing complaint filed by a British citizen against an American plane
manufacturer "[a]lthough the incremental deterrence resulting from potential punitive
damages cannot be termed insignificant").
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global goods disputes." 3 The federal forum non conveniens cases
reveal a similar failure to identify and protect the state substantive
interests at stake. Depending upon the type of product, its distribu-
tion and use patterns within the state, and the defendant's in-state
design or manufacturing conduct, a state often retains a significant
regulatory interest despite its lack of contacts with a specific
accident." 4
Some of the best examples of "classic" foreign products cases
involve overseas automobile injuries. The myriad claims against
Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone arising from rollover accidents in
South America are particularly enlightening. A number of states
had traditional conduct-based contacts with the product. The
Explorer itself was designed and tested in Michigan," 5 where Ford
engineers first observed the vehicle's tendency to roll over during an
accident."6 The additional tendency of the tread on the Firestone
Wilderness ATX and AT tires to separate exacerbated the rollover
problem."' Bridgestone/Firestone engineers likely designed and
tested the tire in either Tennessee, where Firestone has its corpo-
113. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 568-79.
114. General jurisdiction presents a very difficult twist on the state interest problem, which
is beyond the scope of this Article. To assess state interest in a foreign injury case over which
a court has general jurisdiction, the court conducts a choice-of-law analysis using the forum
state's choice-of-law rules. If the forum's conflicts rules point to the law of a sister state, does
the sister state, by definition, have a regulatory interest in the dispute? Worse yet, what if the
sister state uses the traditional place of injury rule, meaning that if the foreign injury claim
had been filed in the sister state, that state's courts would not have applied its own law?
115. Cervantes v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire Co., No. 07C-06-249 JRJ, 2008 WL
3522373, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2008).
116. Recognizing the relationship of the rollover tendency and the tires, the engineers
recommended lower tire pressures to avoid the problem. See Firestone Tire Recall: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. 84 (2000)
(statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (noting that reduced tire pressure
was introduced to mitigate the rollover problem with no address to the suspension issue). This
measure was adopted in place of suggestions by engineers to increase track width, lower
height, and use smaller tires, all of which would have changed the overall look and marketing
design of the product. See PUBLIC CITIZEN & SAFETYFORUM.COM, SPINNING THEIR WHEELS:
How FORD AND FIRESTONE FAIL To JUSTIFY THE LIMITED TIRE RECALL, 4-5 (2001),
http://www.citizen.orgdocuments/ACF266.pdf.
117. See Brian Allen Warwick, Reinventing the Wheel: Firestone and the Role of Ethics in
the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1455, 1456 (2003) (positing that the problem was the result
of a deadly combination of Firestone tread separation and Ford suspension issues).
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rate offices, 11 or Ohio, where Firestone has its research facilities." 9
The defective tires were manufactured at Firestone plants in North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Illinois, 2 ' although those from the
Decatur, Illinois plant apparently had the greatest number of
problems. 2 The American tires were then shipped to Ford plants
in South America and mounted on the vehicle with "tire knockdown
kits" from Florida. 2
2
A number of states, thus, had conduct-based contacts with the
Ford Explorers and Bridgestone/Firestone tires involved in the
South American rollovers. According to the modern view, states
have an interest in regulating injury-causing conduct that takes
place within the state regardless of the place of injury. 23 But the
bigger question asks whether states in which neither the de-
sign/manufacturing conduct nor the injury occurred had an interest
in deterring Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone's dangerous decisions.
Ford's decisions in Michigan, for example, exposed hundreds of
thousands of Americans, as well as drivers worldwide, to identical
risks. From a deterrence perspective, the Michigan decisions af-
fected the states and countries where the Explorer was distributed
as much as they did Michigan itself. In global goods cases, neither
the location of design decisions nor the place of the accident has a
dispositive impact on the deterrence interest of a particular state
-the critical issue is how widely a product is used within that state.
Michigan certainly had an interest in regulating Ford's conduct, but
118. In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1077
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
119. Bridgestone Americas, Inc. Subdivisions & Divisions, http://bridgestone-firestone.com/
divisionsindex.asp?id=about/directorydivisions bfnt (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
120. See Safetyforum.com, Firestone Replacement Tires Already Have Record of Injury
(Aug. 10, 2000), http://www.safetyforum.com/tag/news/000810.html.
121. PUBLIC CITIZEN & SAFETYFORUM.COM, supra note 116, at 15. The same tires were
manufactured in the United States in Wilson, North Carolina, Decatur, Illinois and Aiken,
South Carolina. See Safetyforum.com, supra note 120.
122. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125,
1150 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
123. For example, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws section 145 includes "the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred" as one of the contacts to be taken into
account in applying the most significant relationship test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(b) (1971).
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Michigan's interest was not significantly greater than any other
state in which defective Explorers were extensively distributed.
12 4
Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp.'25 vividly illustrates this phenomenon.
In the Gonzalez case, a Mexican child was killed in Mexico by an
airbag in a Chrysler LHS.'26 The child's father brought suit in
federal court in Texas, but the case was dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds. 2 v The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
reasoning that Texas had no connection to the accident because
the Chrysler had not been designed or manufactured there.'28 Yet
the Chrysler assembled in Mexico and the Chryslers sold in Texas
were equipped with identical TRW airbag systems.'29 Texans were
thus exposed to the same defect that allegedly caused the Mexican
accident. Texas had an interest in regulating Chrysler and TRW's
design and manufacturing decisions in order to protect Texas
consumers from a dangerous product. This interest did not depend
upon the location of the accident; it depended upon the dangerous-
ness of a product used in Texas by Texas residents. 3 °
124. One of the difficulties in assessing state deterrence interests is whether states will
assert them. A state can be reasonably sure that a domestic accident will be accounted for in
a state or federal court somewhere in the United States. Thus, because global products are
not differentially priced to reflect accident payouts state by state, a state can be fairly certain
that a product's price reflects the cost of domestic accidents. But a state cannot be reasonably
certain that the costs of foreign accidents have been adequately internalized by a
multinational entity. Because multinationals routinely escape liability for foreign accidents,
see Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 577-78, the price within the United States may
be artificially depressed. Id. at 575. Yet an individual state may not recognize its
responsibility to ensure that the price of the product reflects its dangerousness on a global
level.
125. 301 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002).
126. Id. at 379.
127. Id. at 378.
128. Id. at 379. The Chrysler was designed and manufactured in the United States, but not
in Texas. Id. at 378-79.
129. See id. at 378-79 (noting that the Chrysler and its air bag system were designed and
manufactured in America and that Gonzalez evaluated the Chrysler in Texas though he
eventually purchased in Mexico).
130. Global markets allow global goods producers like Chrysler to spread the costs of
accidents worldwide. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 574-77. Excluding out-of-
country accidents from U.S. adjudication and/or regulation artificially depresses the price that
American consumers pay for such products, thereby increasing the number of dangerous
products sold domestically. Id. This analysis should differ somewhat when applied to state
as opposed to national markets, but for a state the size of Texas this difference may be
negligible.
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Pharmaceutical injury claims follow the same pattern. Vioxx, for
example, was developed by Merck, a major pharmaceutical company
incorporated and headquartered in New Jersey.'31 Development of
the drug, including the scientific research, safety presentations, and
clinical studies, took place in New Jersey, as did the marketing
decisions.'32 Merck ran strategic clinical studies in various states on
the drug's stomach safety, which were later criticized as marketing
in disguise, to persuade doctors to prescribe the drug to patients and
recommend it to peers. 3 ' The FDA almost certainly approved the
drug from its primary Maryland office.' Subsequently, a study
linked Vioxx to heart attack and stroke.'35 Merck recalled the
product from the market in 2004.136 Internal memoranda revealed
that Merck knew much more about the cardiovascular risks of Vioxx
than it revealed to the FDA or the public.'37
Like the Ford Explorer scenario, several states had traditional
conduct-based contacts with the Vioxx injuries. There is no question
that New Jersey could apply its substantive law to any Vioxx claim,
regardless of the location of the accident. Between 1999 and 2004,
however, 105 million prescriptions for Vioxx were filled in the
United States. 13' The drug also was broadly prescribed around the
world.'39 Any state in which large numbers of patients ingested
Vioxx had an interest in deterring Merck's dangerous behavior,
131. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local # 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 894 A.2d
1136, 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, 894 A.2d 1136 (N.J. 2007).
132. Id.
133. See Vioxx Study a Masquerade, Journal Says; Report Cites Merck Memos on
Painkiller, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2008, at C6 [hereinafter Vioxx Study].
134. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/default.htm (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009).
135. See Vioxx Study, supra note 133.
136. Kyung M. Song, Vioxx Maker Withheld Risk Data, UW Study Says; Arthritis Drug -
Death Rates Also Downplayed, Analysis Finds, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A4.
137. See id. These internal memoranda used different methods for calculating mortality
rates and listed more people as having participated than reported to the FDA. Id.
Additionally, internal memoranda and emails discouraged comparative studies for fear of
heart-related implications and encouraged employees to downplay or gloss over negative
effects of the drug. See W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently
in the European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 368-71 (2006). The alleged fraud and
misrepresentations occurred in New Jersey. See Merck & Co., 894 A.2d at 1148-49.
138. See Thomas, supra note 137, at 365-66.
139. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 (E.D. La. 2006)
(dismissing class action complaints filed by citizens from Italy, France, England, Australia,
South Africa, Canada, Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Poland, and the Netherlands).
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regardless of whether Merck engaged in design, testing, or manufac-
turing conduct in that state.
The design and production of both classic and pharmaceutical
products is often decentralized, giving numerous states conduct
links with the product. But most importantly, from a deterrence
perspective, the place of injury in a global goods case is virtually
irrelevant. Any state in which the product is widely distributed has
an interest in protecting resident consumers from the identical
defects giving rise to the overseas accident.
B. External Limits on State Jurisdiction to Prescribe
As the preceding section demonstrates, the states have significant
substantive interests in global goods disputes arising from overseas
accidents. This makes the federal courts' decision to ignore these
interests all the more curious. The federal judiciary apparently
perceives some external limit on the power of the states to regulate
these international events. The following discussion, therefore,
considers three potential constraints on state prescriptive jurisdic-
tion in the foreign injury context: customary international law, the
federal foreign relations powers, and the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses.
1. Customary International Law
Some years ago, Lea Brilmayer lamented the fact that so few
cases consider the customary international law limits on state
jurisdiction to prescribe. 4 ° Professor Brilmayer posited three
reasons for this phenomenon: the passivity of the state courts, the
need for authoritative adoption of customary international law
norms to bind American courts, and the notion "that review for
consistency with international law is unacceptably counter-
majoritarian."'' Allow me to suggest a fourth: the existence of an
aggressive federal forum non conveniens doctrine that obviates the
need for state courts and federal courts sitting in diversity to
140. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 296 (1994).
141. Id. at 327.
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consider the limits on state legislative jurisdiction in international
cases.
a. State Jurisdiction to Prescribe Under the Restatement
Most international law scholars treat customary international
law as federal law applicable to the states under the Supremacy
Clause. 142 The relevant limits on jurisdiction to prescribe are found
in sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations. 4 3 The requirements in both sections apply equally to the
United States and the constituent states of the United States.144
Section 402 details the legitimate bases for the exercise of legis-
lative jurisdiction,'45 of which only territoriality and nationality are
relevant to private tort actions. 146 Territoriality includes conduct
142. See, e.g., id. at 322-26, 342. See generally Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). "Revisionist" scholars have recently mounted
an attack on this position, contending that customary international law is, in fact, state law,
if the state chooses to adopt it. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815, 870 (1997). Note that the revisionist critique only becomes relevant to the problem
here if customary international law in fact limits state jurisdiction to prescribe in some
meaningful way.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402,403
(1987). Though the Restatement is not without its critics, the Supreme Court has treated it
as authoritative in two recent decisions involving the extraterritorial reach of federal
antitrust statutes. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). For the purposes of discussion
in this Article, the limits of customary international law and those described in the
Restatement are presumed to be equivalent.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt. k (1987) ("[Ain exercise of
jurisdiction by a State [of the United States] that contravenes the limitations of §§ 402-403
is invalid.").
145. Section 402(1) gives a state jurisdiction to prescribe over "conduct that, wholly or in
substantial part, takes place within its territory," "the status of persons, or interests in things,
present within its territory," and "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory." Id. § 402(1). Additionally, the state may prescribe law
regarding "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals," whether inside or
outside of its territory, and "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals"
that affect state security or certain other state interests. Id. § 402(2)-(3).
146. Although section 402 authorizes the exercise of legislative jurisdiction based upon the
territoriality, nationality, protective, and passive personality theories, both the protective
principle, which relates to the "security of the state," and the passive personality theory,
which extends jurisdiction to a defendant accused of harming a "national" abroad, are
inapplicable to private tort actions. See id. § 402(2), (3) cmts. f, g.
114
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within the state147 as well as conduct outside the state that "has or
is intended to have substantial effect[s]" in the state.'48 Nationality
authorizes jurisdiction over "the activities, interests, status, or
relations of [a state's] nationals outside ... its territory.' 49
Once a court determines that section 402 authorizes an American
state connected by conduct and/or nationality to exercise legislative
jurisdiction over a claim, the reasonableness of the jurisdictional
assertion must be assessed under section 403.160 The relevant
factors include:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating
state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within
the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person princi-
pally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.'15
147. Id. § 402(1)(a) (authorizing state jurisdiction over "conduct that, wholly or in sub-
stantial part, takes place within its territory").
148. Id. § 402(1)(c).
149. Id. § 402(2).
150. Section 403(1) prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction "with respect to a person
or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable." Id. § 403(1); see also id. § 403 cmt. a.
151. Id. § 403(2).
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In cases in which "it would not be unreasonable" for more than
one state to exercise jurisdiction "but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict," section 403(3) requires the state with the
weaker interest to defer to the state whose interest is "clearly
greater."'52 Note that the concept of a conflict is defined quite
narrowly. Section 403(3) mandates deference only when one state
requires an act prohibited by the other or when compliance with
both states' regulation is "otherwise impossible.' ' 3 Section 403(3)
does not encompass situations in which the regulated person or
entity is able to comply with the requirements of both of the
regulating states. 54 Moreover, a conflict does not arise simply
because "one state has a strong policy to permit or encourage an
activity which another state prohibits.' 55
b. Applying the Restatement to Global Goods Litigation
Classic and pharmaceutical products disputes fall easily within
the scope of section 402's territoriality category. As previously ex-
plained, disputes arising from global product injuries can typically
be connected to a number of states through design and/or manufac-
turing conduct." 6 More interesting, of course, is the extent to which
U.S. states in which the dangerous product has been extensively
marketed might assert prescriptive jurisdiction based upon
"substantial effect[s]."' The language in the Restatement likely
derives from the "effects doctrine" employed by U.S. courts in
international antitrust cases. 158 Foreign injury claims asserting
effects from product sales within an American state can be distin-
guished from the antitrust scenarios in which the effects and the
injury coincide. It seems somewhat unlikely that effects jurisdiction
can be supported solely on the basis of product distribution and
exposure." 9
152. Id.
153. Id. § 403 cmt. e.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 115-39 and accompanying text (describing Ford Explorer and Vioxx
contacts with U.S. states).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(I)(c) (1987).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
159. Application of the effects doctrine "is generally accepted with respect to liability for
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Nationality provides the other basis through which states may
assert legislative jurisdiction over foreign injury claims.'60 Although
nationality is considered "an exceptional ... basis" for jurisdiction,'6 '
"[i]nternational law has increasingly recognized the right of a state
to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of domicile or residence, rather
than nationality, especially in regard to 'private law' matters such
as ... liability for damages for injury."162 At a minimum, a corpora-
tion is a "national" of the state in which it is incorporated.'63 That
state may arguably regulate corporate activities worldwide.
The section 403 reasonableness analysis is similarly straightfor-
ward in classic and pharmaceutical products disputes. Recall the
Ford Explorer and Vioxx hypotheticals.'" Under subsection (a), the
Explorer claims had substantial territorial "links" with a number of
states including, but not limited to, Michigan, Tennessee, Ohio, and
North Carolina.'65 The Vioxx disputes were territorially connected
to both New Jersey and Maryland. 66 Moreover, the sheer number
of Explorers and affected tires on the roads, and the number of
patients who ingested Vioxx in the conduct states and nationwide,
arguably make the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction all the more
reasonable. Subsection (b) examines the connections "such as
nationality, residence, or economic activity" between the state and
defendant or plaintiff.'67 This section certainly adds Delaware to the
list, as the state in which Ford is incorporated, and may support the
injury in the state from products made outside the state and introduced into its stream of
commerce." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(1)(c) cmt. d. Of course, foreign
injury claims involve injuries outside the state.
160. Id. § 402(2).
161. Id. § 402 cmt. b.
162. Id. § 402 cmt. e.
163. See id. ('The nationality principle is applicable to juridical as well as to natural
persons. For the purposes of this section, the nationality of a corporation or comparable
juridical entity is that of the state under whose law it is organized."). In our Ford Explorer
and Vioxx hypotheticals, Delaware and New Jersey, respectively, could exercise legislative
jurisdiction over worldwide injuries caused by their corporations. See Ford Motor Company,
Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/
dl2Pk6.tfzh.htm; Merck & Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (May 20, 2009),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.s8vs.htm.
164. For a discussion of state conduct contacts with the South American rollover accidents
and the international Vioxx claims, see supra notes 115-39 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987).
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notion that nonconduct states in which the products were exten-
sively marketed might reasonably exercise jurisdiction.
Subsection (c) considers the "character" and "importance" of the
regulation and further inquires how common and desirable such
regulation is around the world.'68 The importance of products
liability and personal injury tort regulation in the United States
cannot be overstated; American states rely on private adjudication
to ensure both adequate compensation to residents and to deter the
sale of dangerous products to consumers.169 Moreover, products
liability laws similar to our own are common among our trading
partners. 70 Certainly a major source of international friction in the
tort realm is the perceived excessiveness of American damage
awards. But this friction is irrelevant to the problem we examine
here-defendants in classic and pharmaceutical disputes are almost
always American resident corporations rather than foreign multina-
tionals.
Subsection (d) is arguably inapplicable. Numerous conflicts
decisions have noted that "justified expectations" generally are
irrelevant to the average personal injury action.' 7' This is particu-
larly true in global goods scenarios in which defendants distribute
products worldwide and cannot predict where accidents will occur. 72
Subsections (e) and (f), focusing on the regulation's importance and
consistency with traditions of the international legal system, are
arguably subsumed by the inquiry in subsection (c).
Subsection (g) considers the interests of other potential regulating
states.'73 Foreign plaintiffs in both classic and pharmaceutical
disputes usually are nationals of the foreign state in which the
injury occurred.'74 In the Venezuelan Explorer cases, for example,
168. Id. § 403(2)(c).
169. See Lear, National Interests, supra note 22, at 571-79.
170. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 1056 U.N.T.S. 187.
171. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Co., 995 P.2d 1002, 1013 (Mont. 2000) (explaining
that tort cases generally do not involve justified expectations and further noting that with
respect to automobiles, "the law of any state could potentially apply in a product liability
action').
172. Id. at 1013-14; see also infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text (discussing the
"unfair surprise" notion in the Due Process jurisprudence).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2)(g) (1987).
174. Air disasters are the major exception to this rule. See, e.g., Van Schijndel v. Boeing
Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 766,768-69 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (dismissing case to Singapore although crash
occurred in Taiwan and plaintiff was Dutch). Piper was unusual in that the plaintiffs and the
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the plaintiffs were Venezuelan, and the Explorers had been
assembled at the Ford assembly plant in Venezuela.175 In global
goods cases, the accident state will have significant interests in both
compensation and deterrence. Moreover, the pharmaceutical cases
often implicate foreign interests beyond simple compensation and
deterrence. Many foreign nations subject pharmaceutical products
to FDA-like approval and oversight. In the Vioxx class action, for
example, the district court relied heavily on the existence of the
French and Italian regulatory schemes to support dismissal.176
Lastly, subsection (h) considers the 'likelihood of conflict with
regulation by another state." '77 Classic products disputes seldom
raise substantive conflicts with foreign nations. In the Venezuelan
Explorer cases, for example, Venezuela's interests were wholly
consistent with those of the American states that might have exer-
cised regulatory authority. Clearly, none of these states had an
interest in compensating Venezuelan victims, but the states'
deterrence interests were dramatic. Not only were the Explorers
and tires designed and manufactured in the United States, but
in-state consumers driving Ford Explorers or using Wilderness
AT tires were exposed to the very dangers experienced by the
Venezuelan victims.' 78 Moreover, the tort laws of the interested
states validated Venezuela's compensation interests. 7 9 Classic cases
crash were both in Scotland. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1981).
175. Note that Ford Venezuela was not named as a defendant in these claims. Only Ford
Motor Company, who was allegedly responsible for the defective design, was named. See Rivas
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 8:02 CV-676-T-17 EAJ, 2004 WL 1247018, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19,
2004) (explaining that the victim worked for Ford Venezuela but named only the parent, Ford
Motor Company, as defendant in action); Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D.
Tex. 2004) (finding Venezuelan plaintiff named only Ford Motor Company as defendant in
action).
176. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. La. 2006).
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2)(h) (1987).
178. See Warwick, supra note 117, at 1461-64 (2003) (explaining that Firestone initiated
a "voluntary" limited recall in August 2000 and that in May 2001, Ford, not Firestone, offered
to replace thirteen million Wilderness AT tires that remained on Explorer models).
179. This can be inferred from two facts: first, Venezuelan plaintiffs would not file their
cases in American courts if the available compensation was inadequate; and, second,
Venezuela itself requested that the Southern District of Indiana, in which the multidistrict
litigation regarding the Ford Explorer took place, retain jurisdiction over the Venezuelan
claims. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125,
1154 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
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generally follow this pattern, thus rendering the potential for
conflict under subsection (h) illusory.
In the pharmaceutical context, however, regulation by an
American state may be at odds with foreign regulatory goals. When
French and Italian citizens attempted to join a Vioxx class action,
for example, the district court concluded that adjudicating plaintiffs'
claims in the United States risked "disrupting the judgments of
Italian and French regulatory bodies by imposing an American
jury's view of the appropriate standards of safety and labeling on
companies marketing and selling drugs" abroad." ° Other pharma-
ceutical cases have reached similar conclusions."' 1 Interestingly,
however, neither the Vioxx court nor the other federal courts
dismissing pharmaceutical injuries on forum non conveniens
grounds analyzed the particulars of the foreign regulatory schemes
at issue.'82
From a conflicts perspective, the mere presence of a foreign regu-
latory scheme surely makes a conflict possible; it does not, however,
make it likely. The American regulatory regime for pharmaceutical
products has proceeded unimpaired for decades with concurrent
state and federal regulation. 8 ' There is no real reason to assume
that the application of state law to a foreign pharmaceutical injury
necessarily undermines the regulatory goals of the foreign nation
any more than it does the goals of the federal government. At a
minimum, assessing "likelihood" must include an actual examina-
tion of the foreign regulatory scheme.
Balancing the section 403(2) reasonableness factors for classic
and pharmaceutical cases yields the following conclusions: (1) it is
highly unlikely that any state assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction
in a classic case will be "unreasonable;" and (2) although pharma-
ceutical cases are more challenging, state regulatory jurisdiction
in such cases should generally satisfy the Restatement's reason-
ableness requirement. Pharmaceutical disputes are more likely to
180. Vioxx, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
181. See, e.g., Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Harrison v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
182. See Vwxx, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 748; Hyland Therapeutics, 807 F. Supp. at 1129;
Harrison, 510 F. Supp. at 4.
183. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (discussing the seventy-year history
of concurrent state and federal regulation of pharmaceuticals).
[Vol. 51:087120
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produce a subsection (h) conflict than classic cases; however, this
conclusion alone does not render a state's exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction "unreasonable" under customary international law.
Section 403(2) is a multifactor balancing test. The typical pharma-
ceutical claim involves a product offered by an American multina-
tional that has been designed and tested in the United States. The
representations made by the defendant to the FDA for domestic
approval may have had direct bearing on foreign approval."s
American consumers have been exposed to the dangerous product.
Moreover, these lawsuits are typically filed against only the
American parent. While state assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction
over foreign pharmaceutical injuries are more likely to raise
conflicts than are classic products claims, this fact does not demon-
strate that state regulation of pharmaceutical claims is generally or
even often "unreasonable" as defined by the Restatement.
Once the reasonableness of jurisdiction is established, section
403(3) must be consulted. This section should rarely come into play
in classic cases. Direct conflicts regarding classic products like
toys or even automobiles are hard to imagine. But direct conflicts
in the pharmaceutical realm are not so difficult to envision. We
can imagine a situation in which a foreign government prescribes
specific, unchangeable labels for a particular pharmaceutical pro-
duct. Any additional requirements imposed by a state'85 would make
compliance with both states' regulations "otherwise impossible."'' 6
At this juncture, the Restatement requires the state with the
weaker interest to defer to the other nation." 7 It is at this point, and
this point only, that a state exercising prescriptive jurisdiction over
a pharmaceutical claim might cross the line drawn by customary
international law. But the likelihood of a state reaching this point
184. See, e.g., Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 638 F. Supp. 901, 909 (noting that Swedish
approval of vaccine was based on information provided to FDA as well as actual FDA
approval).
185. Note that the Supreme Court concluded that state common law causes of action
qualified as "requirements" under the preemption provision in the Medical Device Act. Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-08 (2008). The Court explained that "while the
common-law remedy is limited to damages, a liability award can be, indeed is designed to be,
a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." Id. at 1008 (quoting Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403 cmt.
e (1987).
187. Id. § 403(3).
2009]
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is extremely remote. Although modern conflicts rules may be
manipulated to support almost any choice-of-law decision,'88 the
notion that an American state would apply forum law in the face of
conflicting foreign labeling requirements to a claim arising from a
foreign injury brought by a foreign plaintiff seems rather far
fetched.
2. The Foreign Affairs Powers
The power of the federal government over foreign affairs is often
described as plenary.'89 The Constitution contains a comprehensive
catalogue of specific prohibitions and limitations of state power and
affirmative provisions that vest control over matters concerning for-
eign relations in the federal government. 190 But the Supreme Court
has routinely "gone beyond the specific constitutional language."19'
In United States v. Belmont,192 for example, the Court explained that
"[g]overnmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but
is vested exclusively in the national government," and concluded
that "the external powers of the United States are to be exercised
188. Critics of governmental interest analysis, for example, complain that ascertaining
state purpose is entirely too malleable, see, e.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and
Choice of Law, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 548, 559-60 (1971), and perhaps even fictitious and
unrealistic. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REv. 392, 402 (1980); Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 197, 219-20 (1991).
189. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (finding that state laws are
unconstitutional if they have more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations,
even when no federal law or policy exists in that area); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
233 (1942) (explaining that the limits on state sovereignty include the exclusive power of the
national government over external affairs); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937) (stating that "complete power over international affairs is in the national
government"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936)
(analyzing the "investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty"); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573-74 (1840) (interpreting the
Framers' constitutional intent to cut off all negotiations, communications, and intercourse
between foreign governments and the states).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of
International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA
L. REv. 165, 182 (1988) (discussing the constitutional prohibitions on state power as
manifestations of the Framers' intent to vest the national government with exclusive external
power).
191. Chow, supra note 190, at 182.
192. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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without regard to state laws or policies.' 93 The Court reiterated this
notion in United States v. Pink,'94 stating: "Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively."'95 Numerous commentators have ex-
pressed similar sentiments.'96
The federal foreign affairs powers limit state regulatory authority
in several different contexts. Field preemption, exemplified by
Zschernig v. Miller,'97 prohibits "state action with more than inci-
dental effect on foreign affairs... even absent any affirmative federal
activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence without any
showing of conflict."'98 Other Supreme Court cases have invalidated
state legislation on the basis of "conflict" preemption. In Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,'99 for example, the Court struck
down the Massachusetts Burma law as an interference with
congressional legislation on the subject. °0 American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi,20 1 the most recent of the Court's foreign
affairs decisions, is arguably a hybrid of field and conflict preemp-
tion because the majority relied on an implied conflict with presi-
193. Id. at 330-31.
194. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
195. Id. at 233.
196. See LouIS HENKIN, FOREIGNAFFAIRSAND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 139, 149-
50 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that the states "do not exist" for the purposes of foreign relations);
Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement for Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search
of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 257 (1991)
(suggesting that a national approach to enforcing foreign money-judgments would be
consistent with the federal authority in other areas of foreign affairs); Chow, supra note 190,
at 181-83 (discussing legal and historical evidence that external power is intended to be
vested solely in the national government); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing International
Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121, 136-38 (1997) (urging
that national standards for forum non conveniens should be observed when a foreign party
is involved in litigation in the state courts because it is more "a national issue"); Donald T.
Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1735-36 (1992)
(asserting a need for "a more national approach to choice of law when persons or interests
having relations with foreign nations are involved"); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory
of Transnational Procedure, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 123 (1993) (suggesting that a different
result is necessary in transnational litigation for the forum non conveniens arena).
197. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
198. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418 (2003) (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at
432).
199. 530 U.S. 363 (2001).
200. Id. at 388.
201. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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dential policy to invalidate a California insurance statute.2 °2
Although Zschernig remains good law, Garamendi and Crosby
arguably express a preference for conflict preemption over the
dormant preemption doctrines.2 3 As the Garamendi majority
explained, "Where ... a State has acted within ... its 'traditional
competence,' but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality
that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of
the state concern asserted."2 4
The Court has also relied on the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause to invalidate state legislation. These cases employ tradi-
tional Commerce Clause principles but additionally inquire whether
the state activity "prevent[s] the Federal Government from 'speak-
ing with one voice when regulating commercial relations with for-
eign governments.' 2 5 As Professor Tribe explains, "If state action
touching foreign commerce is to be allowed, it must be shown not
to affect national concerns to any significant degree, a far more
difficult task than in the case of interstate commerce. 20 6 Note that
the Supreme Court has not usually mirrored dormant Commerce
Clause analysis in the foreign commerce decisions.20 7 Professors
Kysar and Meyler point out that it is the "states' practice of sitting
in judgment upon the internal affairs of foreign jurisdictions-and
even attempting to influence those affairs through financial
incentives-[that] has been seen by the Court as the chief concern
of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. 2 8
202. President Clinton approved two measures, essentially agreeing that all Holocaust-era
claims against German companies would be directed to a voluntary compensation fund to the
best of the national government's efforts. Id. at 406. California also enacted legislation to
ensure compensation of Holocaust victims, but that legislation was in conflict with the
executive agreements. Id. at 408-11. Due to the President's authority over foreign policy and
national security, in the absence of Congress's explicit disapproval in the form of law, that
authority is binding on the states. Id. at 429.
203. See Leanne M. Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLuM. L. REV. 746, 746 (2007).
204. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.l (internal citations omitted).
205. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
206. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-21 (2d ed. 1988).
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Lastly, the federal courts have themselves created federal
common law in the foreign affairs arena.0 9 Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,"° in which the Supreme Court adopted the act of state
doctrine,211 is the most famous of these cases. 12 More recently, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits relied on Sabbatino for the notion that
the federal common law of foreign relations applies to private
personal injury actions against defendants with ties to foreign
governments.213 In Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,21 4 for ex-
ample, the Fifth Circuit found that a complaint lodged by Peruvian
miners against American corporations for injuries sustained in
Peru raised a federal question.1 5 According to the Torres court, the
complaint involved Peru's sovereign interests, thus "implicating
important foreign policy concerns."2 6 Other courts of appeals have
similarly applied the federal common law of foreign relations to
state law claims that "significantly affect American foreign rela-
tions. 2 17
209. Although revisionist scholars have recently challenged the validity of the federal
common law of foreign relations, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 142, at 849-70; Jack
L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622-25
(1997), courts and commentators overwhelmingly approve its existence. See id. at 1634-41.
According to Professor Goldsmith, the scope of the federal courts' lawmaking power in the
foreign affairs arena is significantly less settled than its legitimacy. Id. at 1632.
210. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
211. The act of state doctrine states that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Id. at 416 (quoting
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)).
212. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (explaining
that federal common law exists in the "narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and
obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the
conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations").
213. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the plaintiffs' complaint of harm from Peruvian copper smelting raised issues under federal
common law by "implicating important foreign policy concerns"); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757
F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying federal law to a case in which Costa Rican
agricultural workers claimed sterilization as a result of exposure to pesticides manufactured
by international corporations).
214. 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
215. Id. at 543.
216. Id. Note that the Peruvian government submitted amicus briefs in the action and filed
a protest with the State Department. Id. at 542. The Fifth Circuit explained, however, that
Peru's interjection into the suit was not itself sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction.
Id. at 542-43.
217. See, e.g., Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986).
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The run-of-the-mill foreign products injury claim seldom pres-
ents an overt foreign affairs problem. The myriad state statutory
and common law actions for design defect, negligence, breach of
warranty, negligent hiring, and other personal injury torts typically
make no reference to foreign governments or foreign nationals. Nor
do these claims require state courts to sit in judgment of foreign
regimes. The vast majority of foreign injury claims, thus, raise none
of the structural or political competence problems giving rise to
preemption in Zschernig, Crosby, or Garamendi.
On the other hand, substantive state regulation of classic and
pharmaceutical product injuries overlaps significantly with a num-
ber of important federal regulatory schemes. The Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC), created by the federal Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA),218 promulgates rules and standards
regarding consumer products ranging from children's toys to all-
terrain vehicles.219 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)22°
similarly vests the Food and Drug Administration with vast
authority over prescription and over-the-counter drug approvals
and labeling, as well as food safety.221 Federal statutes regulate
218. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2006). This Act specifically
creates and provides the details for the CPSC. 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (2006).
219. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056b (West 2009) (detailing mandatory safety standards for toys);
15 U.S.C.A. § 2089 (West 2009) (including all-terrain vehicles within the scope of the Act and
describing standards of safety). The Act defines a "consumer product" as:
[A]ny article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to
a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise.
15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a)(5) (West 2009). But the Act excludes products such as tobacco and motor
vehicles that are more specifically covered by other acts. Id.
The Act also contains reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (2006). A manufacturer
must immediately notify the Commission when a product creates a "substantial product
hazard." Id. § 2064(b). A majority of federal court decisions have held that there is no private
cause of action for failure to comply with the Act's reporting requirements. See Kehr v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (agreeing with the
Eighth Circuit that allowing a private action for violation of the Commission's reporting rules
would "effectively frustrate Congress's clear intention not to provide a private cause of action
to those injured from a violation of the statute itself).
220. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006).
221. See 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006) (establishing the Food and Drug Administration and
detailing the inner workings of the Administration); 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (conferring
authority to regulate the food and drug industry to the Secretary). The Secretary
subsequently delegated this authority to the Commissioner of the FDA. Patricia I. Carter,
126
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 126 2009-2010
2009] FEDERALISM, FORUM SHOPPING
everything from cigarette labeling and advertising,222 the use of
hazardous substances, 221 automobile safety standards,24 and pesti-
cide labeling,22 to the design of medical devices.226
Some of these federal enactments preempt state regulation. 227 For
example, the Supreme Court recently concluded that the premarket
approval portions of the Medical Device Act (MDA) preempted all
state-created causes of action in the area.22 8 Most of these federal
statutes, however, operate in conjunction with nonconflicting state
regulation.229 With limited exceptions, Congress has preferred
decentralized enforcement in the torts arena.2 0 The CPSA, for
example, creates a private cause of action for violations of rules or
Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 215, 225 (1999).
222. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006).
223. Federal Hazardous Substance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 (2006).
224. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2006).
225. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (2006).
226. Safe Medical Device Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006) (vesting the FDA with power to
monitor medical device safety and effectiveness).
227. A number of federal statutes have provisions that preempt state regulation. For
example, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preemption statute, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) (2006), states, "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." But cf. Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (holding that state claims based on the "duty
not to deceive" were not preempted). On the other hand, the Court found that the Medical
Device Act preempts all state regulation for devices that are pre-approved by the FDA. See
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008) (holding that, under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a),
a state statute may parallel federal regulation but may not differ from or add to it). The
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preemption statute restricts
states from "impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging
in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)
(2006); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431,454 (2005) (holding that a state
statute must be genuinely equivalent to the FIFRA requirements in order to support liability).
228. See Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. at 1011. The MDA provides:
No state ... may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended
for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under [federal law] to the device, and (2) which
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included
in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). The Medtronic Court found that common law actions for damages qualify
as "requirements" for purposes of the MDA preemption clause. 128 S. Ct. at 1008 ("Absent
other indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its common-law duties.").
229. See Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
230. See id. at 1014-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing areas in which state
regulation has been tolerated alongside federal regulation).
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127 2009-2010
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:087
standards created by the CPSC.231 Yet the Act is clear that state tort
actions are not preempted as long as they do not conflict with the
federal requirements.232 And just last term, the Supreme Court in
Wyeth v. Levine233 rejected the notion that the FDCA preempts state
tort remedies for traditional pharmaceutical injuries.23' The Court
emphasized that the legislation revealed no intent to preempt and
that the states have concurrently regulated the pharmaceutical
industry through common law and statutorily-created causes of
action for at least the past seventy years.235
Despite extensive federal regulation in the field, then, the states
play an active and expansive regulatory role in domestic-injury
claims involving consumer products. The question is whether this
calculus changes when the accident moves offshore. The Supreme
Court has not determined the extraterritorial reach of statutes
like the FDCA or the CPSA. And the Court in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.236 emphasized
231. There is no private cause of action for a violation of the CPSA itself, however. Section
2072(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall sustain injury by reason of any knowing (including willful)
violation of a consumer product safety rule, or any other rule or order issued by
the Commission may sue any person who knowingly (including willfully)
violated any such rule or order in any district court of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
232. Id. § 2072(c). Courts have uniformly found that the presence of an action under § 2072
does not preempt additional state remedies. See, e.g., Leipart v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 234
F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to § 2072(c) as a "saving clause" that allows state
action despite 2072(a) action).
233. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
234. Justice Stevens explained in the majority opinion:
The most glaring problem with [defendant's preemption] argument is that all
evidence of Congress' purposes is to the contrary. Building on its 1906 Act,
Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer protection against harmful
products. Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers harmed by
unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or in any subsequent amendment.
Evidently, it determined that widely available state rights of action provided
appropriate relief for injured consumers. It may also have recognized that state-
law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to
produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.
Id. at 1199-2000 (internal citations omitted).
235. Id.; see also Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. at 1017 (noting that the FDCA started requiring
preclearance approval from the FDA for new drugs in 1938 without eliminating the possibility
of state suit and that the state regulation continued despite the presence of federal
regulation).
236. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
128
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that "Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality." '237 Unless Congress uses clear language
demonstrating its "affirmative intention" to regulate foreign actions,
the Court will assume that legislation is "primarily concerned with
domestic conditions."2 ' Thus, absent language indicating that
Congress intended for the CPSC and FDA decisions to apply extra-
territorially, there is a good argument that these regulatory stan-
dards apply only to domestic scenarios. State causes of action that
incorporate or mirror federal safety standards similarly should be
unavailable to foreign plaintiffs.
Left open for debate, however, is the relevance of the federal
decision not to regulate extraterritorially to traditional state tort
actions like negligence or breach of warranty. Intuitively, it seems
odd that a state could apply its substantive law to an overseas
product injury when Congress has restricted the scope of federal
power to domestic accidents. But that intuition is probably wrong.
Congress legislates against a backdrop of state regulation, particu-
larly in the personal injury arena.239 In the domestic preemption
context, Congress must be very clear regarding its intent to displace
traditional state remedies.24 ° As Garamendi explained, a similar
level of clarity is required for foreign affairs preemption.24 ' Given
that the Constitution does not generally debar the states from
remedying overseas injuries and that the personal injury realm is
one over which the states have traditionally exercised extensive
authority, Garamendi requires some indication of congressional
intent to displace state authority.242 A congressional decision to limit
237. Id. at 248.
238. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. As the Third Circuit recently explained, "it is hard to imagine a field more squarely
within the realm of traditional state regulation than a state tort-like action seeking damages
for an alleged failure to warn consumers of dangers arising from the use of a product." Fellner
v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2008).
240. The Supreme Court noted in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr:
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
"legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied," we "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted).
241. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n. 1 (2002).
242. Id.
2009]
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the reach of a federal regulatory program, without more, arguably
says nothing about state regulatory power in the foreign injury
context.
Still, foreign injury complaints raising traditional state tort
claims seem as though they should implicate the federal foreign
commerce power. They have little in common, however, with the
cases in which the federal courts have found Foreign Commerce
Clause violations. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,243
for example, California sought to apply an ad valorem property
tax to Japanese containers used exclusively in international
commerce.244 The Court concluded that California's tax "prevent[ed]
th[e] Nation from 'speaking with one voice' in regulating foreign
trade." '245 This was particularly apparent because an international
agreement already existed regarding containers used exclusively in
foreign commerce.24 The Japan Line opinion emphasized that the
risk of retaliation was "acute" and that such retaliation would be
felt by the "Nation as a whole" rather than simply California.247
In the foreign injury cases, there is no risk of retaliation; there
are no international agreements; and the need for the nation to
speak with one voice regarding safety standards for American
products is not immediately apparent. These are private tort suits
seeking damages for personal injuries from American defendants.
A state's application of state safety standards to a product designed
and/or manufactured in the United States seems quite removed
from the issues typically found in the Foreign Commerce Clause
cases.
Lastly, let us consider whether foreign injury claims "affect,"
"implicate," or have a direct or incidental impact on the foreign
affairs of the United States, supporting the creation of federal
common law. Note that federal and state courts decide hundreds of
cases involving international transactions and events each year. In
order to justify the creation of federal common law, however, a
dispute must boast more than international attributes; it must
243. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
244. Id. at 437.
245. Id. at 452.
246. Id. at 453.
247. Id.
130 [Vol. 51:087
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"implicat[e] ... our relations with foreign nations.""24 Personal injury
actions between parties who are in no way connected with foreign
governments are analytically distinct from Sabbatino, Marcos, and
other cases in which the federal courts have relied on the federal
common law to avoid international embarrassment or to insulate
the actions of a foreign political regime from judicial scrutiny.
"Classic" products injuries, in particular, are unlikely to implicate
the sovereign interests of foreign nations. Classic actions typically
involve American resident defendants and are usually predicated
upon the domestic design and/or manufacturing conduct of an
American corporation. Moreover, state regulation of such injuries
rarely conflicts with the regulatory goals of the accident forum.249
Certainly, foreign substantive law may differ from that of an
American state-one may favor liability only upon a showing of
negligence, for example, while the other may employ a strict liability
formula-but both seek to compensate the victim and/or deter
injury-causing activity. And though damages awards are routinely
larger in the United States than they are abroad,"' ordering a
domestic corporate defendant to "overcompensate" a foreign plaintiff
surely has no impact on the ability of the United States government
to conduct foreign policy.
The pharmaceutical cases present a more complex federal
common law problem because many nations employ their own gov-
ernmental frameworks to regulate pharmaceutical products. 251 Most
forum non conveniens decisions dismissing foreign pharmaceutical
claims rely heavily on the existence of foreign regulatory schemes.
But as previously mentioned, very few of these decisions make any
effort to assess the degree of conflict.252 The federal judiciary
248. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
249. See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text (discussing potential conflict in the
Restatement reasonableness analysis).
250. See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the
United States Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 162 (1999).
251. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. La. 2006)
(mentioning regulatory structure in Italy and France); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., 638 F.
Supp. 901, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Sweden); Harrison v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Great Britain).
252. See, e.g., Vioxx, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (assuming that U.S. litigation risked
"disrupting the judgments of Italian and French regulatory bodies," but never discussing any
aspects of the regulatory regimes); Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Div., 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1129
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same with respect to Irish system); Harrison, 510 F. Supp. at 4 (same with
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assumes that state regulation would interfere with the regulatory
goals of the foreign nation, thus raising a foreign affairs problem.
This assumption is probably inaccurate.
Let us suppose that a foreign government prescribes specific,
unchangeable labels for a particular pharmaceutical product. It
surely does not undermine the federal government's ability to con-
duct international relations for a state or federal district court to
ascertain whether a regulatory compliance defense available under
foreign law bars a state cause of action. The larger question, of
course, is whether the federal government's powers are compro-
mised in the unlikely event a court gets it wrong, so to speak. What
if a district court hearing a French Vioxx case applied New Jersey
law and held that Merck failed to warn even though the French
labeling satisfied French standards? The outcome would not pro-
voke an international incident; technically, the French government
would be completely unaffected by the federal court judgment.
Clearly, Merck would be unhappy. But Merck could pursue tradi-
tional appellate remedies, arguing that New Jersey is prohibited by
international law from applying its own law in such a situation.253
Merck could also lobby the French government for an exception or
lobby Congress for a preemption provision in the FDCA covering
state failure to warn claims in the foreign injury context. But unless
the French government lodged an official protest or at least filed an
amicus brief, the likelihood of a foreign relations problem between
the two nations seems remote.254
respect to British system).
253. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (discussing pharmaceutical conflicts
under the Restatement).
254. Note that I am not suggesting that an American state has a greater interest in these
pharmaceutical cases. As the Doe v. Hyland Therapeutics Division court explained:
[T]he foreign forum's interest in this type of pharmaceutical products liability
action ... stems, not from the mere manufacture of products, but from their sale
to the forum's market, and their use by its citizens. The forum whose market
consumes the product must make its own determination as to the levels of safety
and care required. That forum has a distinctive interest in explicating the
controlling standards of behavior, and in enforcing its regulatory scheme. The
standards of conduct implemented, and the level of damages assessed, will
reflect the unique balance struck between the benefit each market derives from
the product's use and the risks associated with that use; between the
community's particular need for the product and its desire to protect its citizens
from what it deems unreasonable risk. The forum's assessment will affect not
merely the quality of the product, but also the price, quantity, and availability
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The point here is not that conflict is unforeseeable in the pharma-
ceutical context. Certainly, if the American states routinely add
requirements to foreign regulatory schemes, foreign governments
may be moved to protest. But as things stand, there is no demon-
strated need for a prophylactic dismissal rule to avoid rather
unlikely problems. The types of conflicts potentially involved in the
pharmaceutical injury claims are endemic to many international
cases. Consider, for example, the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the federal and state courts. The federal courts
of appeals have consistently concluded that state law governs the
enforceability of a foreign judgment in the United States.2 5 States
thus evaluate the fairness of a foreign judicial system and deter-
mine whether fraud or other irregularities in a foreign nation's
judicial process render a judgment unenforceable.256 Such cases
present a much more direct foreign relations problem than do
foreign injury claims, yet calls to apply the federal common law of
foreign affairs to the judgment cases have fallen on deaf ears.257
to its public. Such an assessment must remain the prerogative of the forum in
which the product is used; each community faces distinct demands, and has
unique concerns that make it peculiarly suited to make this judgment.
807 F. Supp. at 1129. The court is no doubt correct. But the question I address here is not
whether it is a good idea to remedy foreign pharmaceutical injuries but whether a state
exercising regulatory authority in such a case creates a foreign affairs problem. Moreover, the
Doe court's next sentences highlight the very issue this Article considers. Judge Conner went
on to explain:
We are ill-equipped to enunciate the optimal standards of safety or care for
products sold in distant markets, and thus choose to refrain from imposing our
determination of what constitutes appropriate behavior to circumstances with
which we are not familiar. While imposing our presumably more stringent
standards to deter tortious conduct within our borders could afford a higher
degree of protection to the world community, such an approach would also ignore
the unique significance of the foreign forum's interest in implementing its own
risk-benefit analysis, informed by its knowledge of its community's competing
needs, values, and concerns.
Id. at 1129-30. The district court judge has divested the forum state of its right to apply its
"stringent standards." I question the source of the district court's authority to make that
substantive judgment. Judge Conner cites no constitutional or international law limit on the
state's regulatory authority in the pharmaceutical sphere. Undoubtedly, New York should
decline to regulate the foreign event, but that is arguably New York's decision, not the federal
court's.
255. Brand, supra note 196, at 262.
256. Id. at 267 (comparing the various grounds for nonrecognition under the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act).
257. Cases involving foreign currency controls evoke similar problems. These claims are
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Even assuming that some state will apply its own law to a foreign
injury dispute that goes to the heart of a foreign regulatory scheme,
there should be an indication that the sovereign interests of the
foreign country are negatively affected before the state is divested
of its power to regulate the dispute. Something more than a federal
judge's intuition that international cases require federal oversight
should be required.258
3. Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
The relationship between state regulatory jurisdiction in foreign
injury disputes and the Full Faith and Credit259 and Due Process
Clauses26 ° is more straightforward. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause is often irrelevant to international actions since the choice-
of-law analysis involves the law of a foreign nation rather than that
of a sister state.261 Modern choice-of-law jurisprudence, however,
conflates the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit limitations on
state jurisdiction to prescribe.262 The current interstate formula
requires that a state seeking to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
have a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
subject to state choice-of-law rules and may or may not result in the application of state law.
See, e.g., J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 220 (1975)
(applying New York law). Pharmaceutical cases implicate none of the evaluative issues found
in the currency control decisions. For an excellent discussion of the use of state choice-of-law
rules for international cases, see Chow, supra note 190.
258. Ironically, it is the existence of the federal forum non conveniens regime itself, rather
than the substantive state regulation of foreign injury disputes, that provokes international
relations problems. The federal doctrine requires district judges to sit in judgment of foreign
regimes as they evaluate foreign judicial systems. Note further that foreign nations have
responded officially and negatively, not to state assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction over
foreign injury claims, but to the American use of the forum non conveniens doctrine. See
Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a
Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 610 (2008) (discussing statutes in several South
American nations designed to counter forum non conveniens dismissals in the United States).
259. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
261. The Full Faith and Credit Clause becomes relevant only when a sister state, as
opposed to a foreign state, is involved. On the other hand, Full Faith and Credit may be
relevant to foreign products claims because a number of different states may have a
regulatory interest in a single global product.
262. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 & n.10 (1981).
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creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.""2 '
Professor Brilmayer divides the standard into three parts: (1)
"contacts with the forum;" (2) "interests arising from these contacts;"
and (3) "fairness to the defendant."2" Contacts include "events
leading up to the litigation" or perhaps the state residence of the
litigants.265 These contacts must create interests, but as Brilmayer
notes, "courts have offered no satisfactory formulation for what
kinds of interests suffice."2 6 The fairness concept has proven
similarly "elusive.26 7 Dean Larry Kramer defines it in terms of
"avoiding unfair surprise, 268 while another approach inquires
whether the defendant has "voluntarily affiliated him or herself'
with the regulating state.26 9
A close examination of the classic and pharmaceutical disputes
suggests that few such cases exceed the Due Process limits27° on
state jurisdiction to prescribe. Depending upon the exact scope of
the cause of action, traditional conduct-based contacts in classic
products cases include design, manufacture, location of corporate
decision making, particular advertising decisions, and perhaps even
the sale of global products with identical defects.271 In the pharma-
263. Id. at 312-13. The Court was badly fractured in Allstate, but all the justices agreed on
the formula set forth by the plurality opinion. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 818-19 (1985) (applying the same formula). Whether the territorial emphasis in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), modifies the
existing approach is an open question. I suspect State Farm can be distinguished on
punishment grounds, although punitive damages rules are considered "substantive" tort law
designed specifically to deter. The Court repeatedly stressed that the out-of-state conduct
introduced during the trial was "unrelated." Id. at 414-15. The relevance of the case is unclear
to global products cases in which the design or manufacturing conduct that caused the out-of-
state injury is identical to that potentially causing in-state injuries.
264. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1242 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1243.
268. See LARRY KRAMER, TEACHER'S MANUAL To ACCOMPANY CONFLICT OF LAWS 123 (7th
ed. 2006). Dean Kramer suggests that "quid pro quo" is the other dimension of Due Process.
He notes that "both elements are found in ... Home Ins. v. Dick." Id.
269. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 264, at 1243.
270. For ease of analysis, I refer to the conflated Due Process/Full Faith and Credit
analysis as simply the Due Process analysis for the remainder of this section.
271. In the Venezuelan rollover example, we find a number of states with constitutionally
cognizable contacts. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
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ceutical cases, states in which clinical trials were held or where the
defendant made representations to the FDA may be added to the
list.2 72 And in both the classic and pharmaceutical categories, states
in which large numbers of the allegedly defective product were sold
also have contacts with the dispute.273
Whether the contacts in classic and pharmaceutical products
claims create sufficient state interests is a trickier problem. The
traditional purposes of products liability laws are to protect state
citizens from injury and to compensate state residents injured by
dangerous products.274 A state with conduct contacts could assert a
deterrence interest regardless of the place of injury. A manufactur-
ing and design state might additionally enact products liability
legislation to protect the state's reputation for the manufacture or
design of safe products thereby protecting state employment from
crushing liability.
It is unclear whether contacts based on product sales within a
state, without more, are sufficient to create cognizable state inter-
ests. Language in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague suggests the state
may need sufficient contacts with the "occurrence," '275 that is, the
specific accident, to pass constitutional muster. And State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell276 concluded that law-
ful, dissimilar out-of-state conduct cannot be the basis for a punitive
damages award. Although State Farm noted that punitive damages
have both deterrent and retributive purposes,277 the Court treated
punitive damages as almost completely retributive throughout
the opinion. 278 Applying state law to an out-of-state accident in an
272. The Vioxx example reveals that several U.S. states had significant contacts. See supra
notes 131-39 and accompanying text (describing Merck contacts for purposes of analysis under
Restatement).
273. Whether such contacts create constitutionally cognizable interests is a separate
question.
274. For example, in Phillips v. General Motors Corp., which involved an accident in
Kansas that killed Montana residents, the Montana Supreme Court canvassed the purposes
of the various states' products liability laws finding in each state that the law was designed
to prevent injuries to state residents and ensure compensation. 995 P.2d 1002, 1009 (Mont.
2000).
275. 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (noting that Minnesota had "three contacts with the parties
and occurrence giving rise to the litigation").
276. 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
277. Id. at 416.
278. The Court used the word "punish" repeatedly in the opinion. See, e.g., id. at 420-23.
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attempt to protect in-state residents from the identical product
defect arguably falls outside the concerns extant in State Farm. By
compensating the foreign-injury victim, the state seeks simulta-
neously to deter the out-of-state defendant. No desire to punish the
defendant for noninjurious conduct is evident. Clearly, however,
applying state law to an out-of-state injury simply on the basis of
product contacts is not frequently observed in the choice-of-law
realm.279
Lastly, the Due Process analysis considers whether it would be
arbitrary or unfair to apply the contact states' law to defendant's
conduct. Foreign injury defendants may seek support from Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick,2" which involved a Texas plaintiff who en-
tered into a contract in Mexico to insure a vessel operating exclu-
sively in Mexican waters.2"' Although Texas had a clear interest in
the compensation of one of its citizens,2"2 the Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause prohibited Texas from applying forum
law to the dispute.2 3 The holding hinged on a combination of unfair
surprise and lack of voluntary affiliation.2 4 According to the Court,
the American defendant could not have anticipated that Texas law
might apply to the transaction when it contracted to insure the
property. Moreover, the Court stressed that the defendant had not
asked for anything from Texas; it had only asked to be "let alone." '285
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, decided some seventy years later,
employed a similar reliance rationale, holding that Kansas could
279. Interestingly, in the personal jurisdiction arena, the "volume" of contacts with or
products used within the state is one of the classic factors to which early opinions refer. See,
e.g., Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). Moreover, volume may be relevant
to a finding of "continuous and systematic ... business contacts" within the forum state under
general jurisdiction analysis. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444
F.2d 745, 745 (4th Cir. 1971), declined to exercise general jurisdiction over a pharmaceutical
defendant despite widespread distribution of the drug within the state.
280. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
281. Id. at 403.
282. Dick was a permanent resident of Texas, although he resided in Mexico at the time
of contract formation and at the time of the loss of his boat. Id. at 403-04.
283. Id. at 407.
284. Id. at 408, 410.
285. Id. at 410.
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not apply its law to out-of-state lease agreements with residents of
other states.2"
Global goods claims bear only a superficial resemblance to Dick
and Shutts, however. Both Dick and Shutts involved distinct
property (either insured or leased) in a specific geographic location.
In the Ford Explorer accidents, for example, neither the cars nor the
tires were designed or manufactured for particular geographic
markets. Similarly, Vioxx was distributed worldwide without mate-
rial modifications for specific markets. By marketing and distribut-
ing identical products to every state in the United States as well as
numerous countries overseas, Ford and Merck, like other global
goods manufacturers, voluntarily affiliated themselves with political
units worldwide.
Global goods cases more closely resemble Allstate and Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,"7 both of which involved
insurance contracts covering nationwide losses. According to the
Supreme Court, neither insurer could rely on the application of a
specific state's law because there was no way to predict where the
loss might occur.2" Similarly, a global goods manufacturer cannot
predict where its product will cause injury. And although the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts "presumes" that the accident
state has the greatest interest in a torts dispute," 9 a design or
manufacturing state's law is certainly a legitimate choice in a
product defect case under the Second Restatement rubric.29 ° Given
that a large number of U.S. states apply the Second Restatement,29'
Ford could not claim to be surprised by the application of Michigan
law to any Explorer accident occurring outside of Michigan; nor
could Merck claim surprise by the application of New Jersey law to
286. 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
287. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
288. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 315-16 (1981); Watson, 348 U.S. at 71-72.
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 145, 146 (1971) (stating that for torts the
presumptive place of most significant relationship is the place of the accident).
290. "mhe place where the conduct causing the injury occurred," the place of residence of
the parties, and the place of the center of the parties' relationship are all relevant to the
decision regarding which state has the most significant relationship. Id. § 145(2)(b)-(d). In a
products liability case, the place of design or manufacture might well have a more significant
relationship than the place where the injury occurs.
291. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in theAmerican Courts in 2004: Eighteenth
Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 942-44 (2004) (reporting that twenty-two states use
the Second Restatement for torts cases).
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an out-of-state death allegedly caused by Vioxx. From an anticipa-
tion standpoint, the location of the accident in a global goods case is
functionally irrelevant.
Finally, it should be noted that the defendant's state citizenship
alone may provide sufficient basis for state regulation of out-of-state
conduct under the Due Process Clause. In Skiriotes v. Florida,292 the
Supreme Court rejected a Due Process challenge by a Florida citizen
to the application of Florida law prohibiting the gathering of
sponges in international waters.293 The Court held that Florida
could regulate its citizens' conduct, whether in international waters
or in foreign countries, so long as such regulation did not conflict
with that of a foreign nation.294 Thus, foreign injury defendants'
states of incorporation arguably may regulate their conduct
worldwide, provided such regulation is not unreasonable under
international law.
CONCLUSION
In the name of federalism, the federal courts encourage substan-
tial horizontal forum shopping by domestically injured plaintiffs
and ruthlessly thwart vertical shopping activity in domestic actions.
Yet move the accident offshore and the federal courts' commitment
to federalism evaporates. Federal judges actively regulate forum
shopping in international torts disputes. Foreign injury plaintiffs
find their forum choices the subject of meticulous oversight, while
foreign injury defendants enjoy unlimited and rewarding vertical
shopping opportunities in the federal courts.
Two themes found in the federal forum non conveniens decisions
may explain the courts' divergent approach to international forum
choice. First, the federal courts presume that foreign injuries im-
plicate no substantive state interests. Second, the federal judiciary
appears to assume that some greater federal interest overrides state
concerns when the accident occurs overseas. Both assumptions are
wrong.
292. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
293. Id. at 79.
294. Id. at 73 ("[The United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when
the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.").
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From a deterrence perspective, it is irrelevant whether an out-of-
state injury occurs in a sister state or a foreign state. The states
retain significant, identifiable interests in global goods litigation.
Defective products injuries have gone global. Consumers in South
Carolina and South America routinely face identical risks posed by
identical products.
Moreover, neither the Constitution nor customary international
law materially restricts the states' jurisdiction to prescribe in
global goods disputes. An analysis of the relevant portions of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations reveals that customary
international law imposes only minor limitations on state regulatory
power. Whereas classic claims are unproblematic, some pharma-
ceutical claims may exceed the Restatement's limits. As a general
matter, state assertions of jurisdiction in pharmaceutical disputes
are "reasonable" as defined by the Restatement. But the occasional
case may generate an irreconcilable conflict with a foreign regu-
latory scheme. In this limited subset of pharmaceutical claims,
therefore, customary international law may divest the states of
substantive regulatory authority.
Similarly, the federal foreign affairs powers only marginally
constrain state legislative authority in the global goods context.
State common law and statutory causes of action applicable to
foreign products injuries seldom, if ever, encroach upon or relate to
the United States government's ability to conduct foreign policy.
Because the federal consumer product and pharmaceutical regula-
tory schemes likely extend only to domestic injuries, state claims
that incorporate federal statutory standards may be preempted with
respect to foreign injury disputes. The states, however, retain ex-
tensive substantive regulatory power over foreign pharmaceutical
product injuries in the form of traditional state remedies.
Lastly, the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses impose
virtually no relevant restrictions on state regulatory authority in
transnational tort claims. In global goods cases, a number of states
typically boast design, manufacturing, or other conduct-based
contacts with the product at issue. Because these products are ex-
tensively distributed domestically and abroad, a foreign injury
defendant can hardly be surprised by the application of a particular
state's law.
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As this Article has demonstrated, federal judicial oversight of
international forum shopping is incompatible with the critical goals
of American federalism. Simply put, the forum non conveniens
regime interferes with the states' ability to govern. The time has
come for the federal judiciary to abandon the forum non conveniens
doctrine as an unauthorized usurpation of state regulatory author-
ity.
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141 2009-2010
HeinOnline  -- 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 142 2009-2010
